For their part, the editors of the New York Post argued last week that the Associated Press may have helped create Fallujah -- a stunning cheap shot aimed at downplaying the grisly images and what they might say about the Iraqi insurgency.

"The fact that a small crowd of thuggish Sunni tribesmen cheered while their blood-maddened brethren hacked up charred corpses for grateful Western cameramen doesn't mean that Americans are widely despised in Iraq.

"In fact, it doesn't mean anything at all -- except that freedom's enemies in Fallujah are both savage and clever."

While the Post itself uses the nonpartisan news service's photos, it didn't hesitate to peddle a flimsy AP conspiracy theory:

"Consider: Victims of other attacks in Iraq have not generally been burned and mutilated after their deaths.

"So why the extra savagery this time? Because the cameras were there. Like their brethren in Gaza and the West Bank, these fiends know when and how to perform for maximum propaganda effect.

"And don't think that Associated Press Television just happened to turn up at the right place at the right time for the burning and hacking of corpses. After all, last week the AP had dramatic on-the-spot, perfectly timed, close-up photographs of insurgents firing RPGs at Coalition troops. Clearly, someone at AP has a mutually beneficial relationship with the insurgents in Fallujah."

(The AP responded angrily that the Post's editorial amounted to a grave disservice to professional journalism and to "the brave men and women who have risked their lives covering this story.")

The debate over military reprisal
Several conservatives with military expertise have weighed in with different ideas about how to best deal with the latest Iraqi uprisings. Writing in Opinion Journal, journalist and "Black Hawk Down" author Mark Bowden asserts that "the gory carnival on the streets of Fallujah is not evidence of the [U.S.] mission's futility, nor is it something to chalk up to foreign barbarity." Rather, the Fallujah attacks, argues Bowden, represent a succinct strategy of its perpetrators:

"Lynching is deliberate. It is opportunistic rather than purely spontaneous, and it has a clear intent: to insult, to challenge and to frighten the enemy, and to excite and enlist allies ... Respectful treatment of the dead is the norm in all societies, and a tenet of all religions. Publicly flouting such basic dignities is a communal expression of hatred designed to insult and frighten. Display of the mutilated remains must be as public as possible. In Fallujah they were strung high from a bridge. In Mogadishu, where there were no central squares or bridges, the bodies were dragged through the streets for hours. The crowd, no matter how enraged, welcomes the camera -- Paul Watson, a white Canadian journalist, moved unharmed with his through the angry mobs in Mogadishu on Oct. 4, 1993. The idea is to spread the image. Cameras guarantee the insult will be heard, seen and felt. The insult and fear are spread across continents."

Bowden offers no specifics about what the U.S. military should do in response, though he seems to endorse a powerful reprisal, as he warns against repeating the mistakes of Mogadishu. Still, he does not discuss the potential danger to innocent civilians that a major U.S. counterattack would likely pose, nor its potential political repercussions.

"The worst answer the U.S. can make to such a message -- which is precisely what we did in Mogadishu -- is back down. By most indications, Aidid's supporters were decimated and demoralized the day after the Battle of Mogadishu. Some, appalled by the indecency of their countrymen, were certain the U.S. would violently respond to such an insult and challenge. They contacted U.N. authorities offering to negotiate, or simply packed their things and fled. These are the ones who miscalculated. Instead the U.S. did nothing, effectively abandoning the field to Aidid and his henchmen. Somalia today remains a nation struggling in anarchy, and the America-haters around the world learned what they thought was a essential truth about the United States: Kill a few Americans and the most powerful nation on Earth will run away. This, in a nutshell, is the strategy of Osama bin Laden."

Bowden further argues that it's not just the culprits themselves who should pay for the Fallujah attacks:

"The rebels in Iraq who ambushed those American security workers in Fallujah ought to be hunted down and brought to justice, but they are not the only ones responsible. The public celebration that followed was licensed and encouraged by whatever leadership exists in Fallujah. Whether religious or secular, its insult, warning, and challenge has been broadcast around the world. It must be answered. The photographic evidence should be used to help round up those who committed these atrocities, and those who tacitly or overtly encouraged it."

But conservative blogger Steven Den Best, who often focuses on military strategy, cautions against anything other than a carefully discriminating response.

"The key point to remember is this: the strategic goal of terrorism is to provoke reprisals.

"Most of the activity by insurgents in Iraq during the last year was technically guerrilla warfare. Like terrorism, guerrilla warfare developed as a way for weak forces to fight against strong ones. But guerrilla war aims to harm the enemy by direct action; that's the main distinction between the two...

"The goal of this attack [in Fallujah] is to inspire American fury. What they hope is that the Americans will be blinded by hatred and will do something extremely stupid: to punish the Sunnis collectively for the actions of the terrorist group.

"Remember, that's the basic theory behind terrorism; that's the core of the doctrine of terrorism as a form of violent warfare. It is not the terrorist act itself which helps advance the political goals of the terrorist group; it is rather the reprisal. Terrorism is a form of jiu-jitsu, a way of using an enemy's strength against himself. (In jiu-jitsu, you don't throw an opponent. You aid him in throwing himself.)"

The Iraqis' perception of an American response, argues Den Beste, is critical:

"If there are broad reprisals against the uncommitted friendly population because of the acts of the terrorists, that population will become motivated and polarized in favor of the position held by the terrorists. If the American response is viewed by the Sunnis as being directed broadly at all Sunnis, rather than being targeted specifically at those responsible for this outrage, then there's every likelihood that the Sunnis will begin to wonder whether the U.S. is actually genuine in its attempts to include the Sunnis as equal partners in the new government of Iraq. That would be a major victory for al Qaeda."

- - - - - - - - - - - -

Read more of "Right Hook," Salon's weekly roundup of conservative commentary and analysis here.

Recent Stories