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Tuesday, Nov 24, 2009
First, it's his second term. Because of what is politely called "domestic political constraints," U.S. presidents are far more likely to make bold moves in the Middle East during a second term. Bush no longer has to worry about being reelected or running afoul of Congress or the Israeli lobby.
Second, Iraq -- and the entire region -- is a mess. The neocon dream that rolling up Iraq would weaken the Palestinians and strengthen Israel proved to be a nonstarter. Even more important, as the Strategic Defense Report, among many other studies, concluded, Bush's Iraq invasion, far from weakening the Islamist radicals, has greatly strengthened them. The elections were a feel-good story and provided some inspiring TV moments during Bush's State of the Union speech, but the future of Iraq remains highly problematic, with civil war still a possibility.
It is at least arguable that Bush knows these things and wants to rectify them or at least balance them with some good news.
Third, certain personnel decisions indicate a new realism about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fire-breathing anti-Oslo ideologue Doug Feith, who helped push through the bogus intel that justified the Iraq war, is departing as No. 3 at Defense, and Condoleezza Rice has appointed trade representative Robert Zoellick, a realist, as her deputy at State, a defeat for hard-liners who wanted an ideologue installed. (Cheney reportedly wanted über-hawk John Bolton to get the job.) Rice could end up being in effect a Powell clone on Mideast policy (a big if), but one who unlike Powell has Bush's confidence and ear. The ongoing FBI investigation into possible spying by the legendarily powerful Israel lobby, AIPAC, may also have weakened the neocons: According to a recent piece by Washington Post columnist David Ignatius, "more than a half-dozen officials in the Bush administration who are apparently suspected of leaking classified information to AIPAC have had to retain defense lawyers."
Fourth, Arafat is gone. Bush, like Sharon, demonized the enigmatic Palestinian leader and refused to deal with him. Bush, famous for personalizing politics, has a far better opinion of Abu Mazen.
Finally, Bush has clearly empowered Rice to push Sharon not to derail Abu Mazen's chances before he gets out of the gate. The United States has already leaned on Israel to stop its policy of seizing "absentee" Palestinian land in East Jerusalem (a policy advocated by that great champion of democratic governance and Bush reading-list favorite Natan Sharansky) and is clearly interested in at least getting the peace process started.
But just how much weight to give these factors is uncertain. Skeptics point to the fact that Rice never mentioned the so-called road map during her visit to the region, which they see as a sign that Bush is not seriously engaged. (However, in the current issue of Bitterlemons, a forum for Israeli and Palestinian discussion, Israeli liberal Yossi Alpher argues that ignoring the road map is actually wise at this point and that it's better to let the process play out.) Then there is Bush's momentous April 14 letter to Sharon that essentially reversed the long-standing American condemnation of Israeli settlements, saying that "new realities on the ground" have to be taken into account. To say the least, that letter does not inspire confidence that Bush will be an honest broker.
One could go on and on amassing pros and cons. But at bottom, trying to assess what Bush will do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict involves weighing his history, his beliefs and ideologies. Do his track record as the most pro-Israeli president in history, his long association with pro-Israel neoconservatives, and his own religious beliefs and political disposition mean he will continue to embrace Sharon's vision? If so, then the entire peace process that is now getting underway is just a sham, intended to provide domestic and international political cover and certain to blow up sooner or later. (Skeptics can also argue that Bush had no choice but to go along with the current peace process: The death of Arafat forced his hand.)
The problem with this assumption is that Sharon's vision is so manifestly at odds with U.S. interests that it's hard to imagine why Bush would embrace it. Only the most rabid ideologues (who have, unfortunately, been in charge of U.S. foreign policy for the last four years) could ignore the fact that letting the Israeli-Palestinian crisis fester is the stupidest and most self-destructive thing America could do. But it is hard to know how to evaluate the strategic thinking of those who decided that the best way to deal with Islamic extremists, and the Arab-Muslim world in general, would be by defending Sharon at every turn and then invading an Arab state.
If Bush is really determined to stick with Sharon to the end, his thinking might be something like this: At the end of the day, I will have rolled up or neutralized the only three states that can really hurt Israel and help the Palestinians: Iraq, Syria and Iran. The famous, overrated "Arab street" will squawk but do nothing. Cut off from outside help, the Palestinians will split into two camps: those willing to take the Bantustans I will offer them, and the rejectionists. There will be a civil war, and at the end the survivors will be too weak to do anything but take the Bantustans. The Arab-Muslim world will be angry and humiliated, but the great democracies we have created in the region will offer another way and they'll get over it. There may be a terror attack or two, but they could happen anyway.
This is a frightening strategic vision -- but it is the one that until now the Bush administration has followed.
In fact, it is unlikely that Bush has anything so hawkish, pro-Sharon or even coherent in mind. More likely, he's going along for the peace ride now, happy to look like a good guy in the Middle East for once, hoping that some solution will magically appear that will resolve the problem later with both sides happy and without his having to confront Sharon.
That hope-for-the-best attitude is understandable. But if that is the best that Bush can do, it will not work. A passive, reactive U.S. stance will inevitably lead to the end of the cease-fire, to more Israeli and Palestinian deaths, to the continuation of a tragedy that has seared the souls of two peoples. And it will almost certainly be the end of the possibility of a two-state solution in Palestine. And with that lost horizon, more Arab despair, more Muslim rage, more U.S. alienation from the rest of the world, more fundamentalist fanaticism, more danger of horror and death in Paris, or New York, or Jerusalem, or Los Angeles, or Ramallah, or Chicago.
It may seem mean-spirited, with hopes for peace alive for the first time in years, to demand that Bush get to work. But if he doesn't, the moment will pass -- and what will follow will be a history we already know.
