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Monday, Nov 9, 2009
Neocons were dead wrong about Iraq in at least 21 (count 'em) ways. Yet Wolfowitz, Krauthammer et al. are nevertheless pushing for "preemption" in Iran.
Aug 11, 2004 | These must be strange days to be a neoconservative: caught between exultant hope and wild terror; utterly discredited, yet still securely in power; proven totally wrong on Iraq, yet still determined to believe against all odds that one more wild throw of the dice will recoup all.
To the casual observer, the neocons in the Bush administration and their impeccably drilled and regulated cheering section across the commanding heights of the U.S. broadcast and print media have been routed. Since the hand-over of power to the interim Iraqi government, the media have for the most part turned their sensitive faces away from Iraq, giving the public the false sense that it is becoming quiet there. The 138,000 U.S. troops still bogged down in Iraq know better, even if Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz can't recall before a congressional committee just how many Americans have died: Fifty-four were killed in July, a significant rise from the 42 who died in June, the month before the hand-over; and the total in August already looks as if it will exceed that in July.
But the perception that the neocons -- including Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith -- have been routed, or are in retreat, could not be further from the truth. They are as firmly in control of the levers of real power in the government as they were in the yearlong, synchronized buildup to their war in Iraq. Not a single National Security Council or Pentagon official who eagerly rode the bandwagon for the war has been fired. Dick Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby, and aide John Hannah continue to enjoy the full confidence of the vice president.
In the media, it is the same story. Rupert Murdoch has not suffered a sudden fit of shame and forced William Kristol to relinquish control of the Weekly Standard. Time magazine and the Washington Post have not shown one iota of embarrassment that they continue to provide a platform for columnist Charles Krauthammer, whose histrionics have now ascended into a call for our next "preemptive" war -- this time with Iran. If that happens, of course, hundreds, probably many thousands, of young Americans will pay with their lives for a new wave of appalling bungles. And if the past is prologue, no neocon in government should ever expect to lose a job.
None of these characters (like the president) has said as much as an "I am sorry" or "I was mistaken" over their major assumptions and assertions about Iraq, every one of which has been proved wrong. They have shown no capacity whatsoever for self-criticism, so it is not surprising that they do not seem interested in self-correction that might prevent a repeat of their policy catastrophes.
What are all these wrong predictions, which are now at risk of being relegated down the memory hole as Orwellian nonhistory that never happened? There are at least 21.
First, that the Iraqi army would instantly collapse as soon as U.S. forces crossed their border in a "cakewalk."
Second, that Ahmed Chalabi, now charged by our own puppet Iraqi government with money laundering and counterfeiting, would quickly emerge as the popular natural leader of Iraq once President Saddam Hussein was toppled.
Third, that because no serious anti-American guerrilla operations could ever get established Iraq, only a small number of U.S. troops would have to remain after the fall of Saddam.
Fourth, that strong links between Saddam and al-Qaida would be found following our occupation.
Fifth, that overwhelming evidence of weapons of mass destruction would quickly be uncovered by U.S. troops.
Sixth, that the U.S. occupation of Iraq would discredit and weaken al-Qaida throughout the Arab and wider Muslim world.
Seventh, that Iraq would quickly develop a stable democracy after the fall of Saddam.
Eighth, that Sunni and Shiite forces would never find common cause against U.S. forces.
Ninth, that reconstruction in Iraq would occur quickly and easily (disproving the State Department's far more cautious assessment of how difficult it would be).
Tenth, that NATO didn't matter and we could safely ignore it in occupying Iraq.
Eleventh, that the United Nations didn't matter and that we could safely ignore it as well.
Twelfth, that we could put together a militarily significant "coalition of the willing" -- which recalcitrant allies like France and Germany would quickly regret not joining and thus finally be prevailed upon to send in troops to ease the burden on our own forces in Iraq.
