Historical perspective was severely lacking in the policy process. If the administration had considered Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, some of the overly optimistic assumptions about Iraq might have given way to cogent analysis. In the summer of 1982, then Minister of Defense Sharon sought regime change in Lebanon. Upon their entry to Shiite west Beirut, Israeli soldiers were welcomed with rose petals and candy. Yet this enthusiastic welcome turned to hostility as Israel's Lebanese Christian Phalange allies proved unable to generate the requisite legitimacy among Lebanon's sectarian and political factions to effectively rule the country. Subsequently, the Israelis became entangled in Lebanon's complex politics, and the Israeli Defense Force's occupation of Beirut and southern Lebanon became brutal. Sound familiar?

Not only is the current administration seemingly unable to draw the appropriate lessons from its closest regional ally's own disastrous experience with regime change, but the Bush team has also been unwilling to consider the counsel of experts and allies. As a result, Washington seems to believe that a sheer demonstration of strength will bring the Arabs along. It has not happened, and it is not likely to happen. Egyptian, Qatari, Bahraini, Jordanian and Saudi officials all flatly refuse to even consider sending forces to Iraq to assist the United States. As one Egyptian official said, "We understand the complexities of Iraq, but the Bush administration refused to listen to us. Under no circumstances will the government send Egyptian forces to Iraq."

To be sure, past Arab advice has been cynical and self-serving, but in the months preceding the war Washington's Arab allies actually had fairly good advice for the administration. For the most part, our Arab allies counseled Washington not to go to war because Saddam was a paper tiger, but if there was going to be war, the United States should do everything possible to make its occupation short. Toward that end, the Iraqi military -- save the Republican Guards and special Republican Guards -- should be left intact not so much to help U.S. troops but as an "employment program." In addition, Baathist functionaries, not hardcore party members, are an important resource, with expertise to offer in administering the country. Finally, Washington must do everything possible to prevent the centrifugal forces of Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite politics from pulling the country apart.

The fact that the Coalition Provisional Authority is now looking to recruit Baathist civil servants to assist in the reconstruction and hand-over of sovereignty on June 30 vindicates what Arab officials said from the start. It may be too late, however. Demobilized officers, recruits and civil servants either have thrown in their lot with the insurgents or are too afraid to be seen as collaborators. As far as holding the country together, the transitional administrative law that was signed on March 8 makes an admirable effort to bind the three major Iraqi communities together and process their grievances through democratic institutions. Yet the Shiite leadership repudiated the document almost immediately. For now, Iraq is being held together by the force of U.S. arms and Tammany Hall-style politics in which U.S. commanders, with varying degrees of success, are buying off the quiescence of Iraqi tribesmen, religious leaders and other political figures.

It is not only in relation to Iraq that there has been a distinct lack of shura (consultation), a concept that is critically important in Arab political culture but also on the issue of greatest importance to Arabs: the Arab-Israeli conflict. As one Saudi official noted in Riyadh, "Iraq is a minor irritant in comparison to the administration's handling of the situation in Palestine."

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