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Friday, Jul 10, 2009
A new terrorist document shows that as the U.S. flails in Iraq, only al-Qaida seems to have a strategy.
Apr 14, 2004 | National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice told the 9/11 commission last week that President Bush was "tired of swatting flies" when it came to counter-terrorism, and that he wanted a "broader package of strategies" that didn't merely deal with individual terror attacks after they occurred, but eliminated the threat of terror permanently. Unfortunately, it looks as if the Bush administration has traded swatting flies for stirring hornets' nests.
There's increasing evidence that the administration's policies, particularly its war with Iraq, has played into its enemies hands, drawing the United States and its allies into several theaters of confrontation at once and helping to neutralize the Americans' decisive advantage in conventional warfare. One interesting window into the Islamic resistance's new strategy comes from a 42-page Arabic document called "Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers," which was posted on an extremist Islamist Web site supportive of al-Qaida around December 2003. Counter-terrorism researchers at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) translated it, and they believe it's a strategy paper intended for the resistance fighting within Iraq. While no one knows for sure who authored the paper, its significance became apparent after the March terrorist attacks in Madrid, just days before the Spanish election. The jihadist strategy paper had recommended "painful strikes" against Spain specifically around the time of the Spanish elections, aimed at weakening Spain's resolve to stay in the coalition in Iraq.
The jihadist document was ostensibly prepared by the Media Committee for the Victory of the Iraqi People (Mujahedin Services Center). The reference to a "services center" (markaz al-khidmaat) calls to mind the Services Bureau (maktab al-khidmaat) established in Peshawar, Pakistan, during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. Indeed, al-Qaida grew out of the Peshawar Mujahedin Services Bureau in the late 1980s, and the resurfacing of a services center for jihadists in Iraq indicates that the war in Iraq has created a new focal point for militant Islamists instead of being a step toward their destruction. The new Mujahedin Services Center was possibly conceived by Saudi jihadist Yusuf Al-Ayiri, who was reportedly killed by Saudi security forces in May 2003.
Al-Qaida's objective in attacking American targets on 9/11 was to convince its recruitment base in the Muslim world that the United States was not invulnerable, thereby creating opportunities to expand its terrorist jihad. A surgical military operation against al-Qaida, as well as its financiers and supporters, would have denied the terrorists a wider international audience for radical Islamism. The war for regime change in Iraq, even if well intentioned, has had the opposite effect.
Al-Qaida and its extremist supporters know that America cannot be coerced to leave Iraq by military or political means alone. But according to the authors of "Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers," the Islamist resistance can succeed by making the occupation of Iraq as costly as possible for the United States. One of that document's most important recommendations is to attack American allies present in Iraq "because America must not be allowed to share the cost of occupation with a wide coalition of countries." The goal of the jihadists is "to make one or two of the U.S. allies leave the coalition, because this will cause others to follow suit and the dominos will start falling."
The Bush administration's rush to war in Iraq, and its relative indifference to forging a coalition with traditional allies, are apparently fulfilling the best-case strategic scenario envisioned by the jihadists.
