Herbert J. Gans, professor of sociology at Columbia University, author of "Urban Villagers"
I hope there will be an opportunity to ask some basic questions before any planning begins, and I have several. First, if global warming or some other cause could mean frequent catastrophic hurricanes in the future, maybe New Orleans should not be rebuilt. Or perhaps only those parts necessary to keep the port operating. The high ground in and around the French Quarter could become a tourist-museum island in the gigantic wetlands into which New Orleans had already been sinking before Katrina.
I also have questions about what will be planned for New Orleans' population. How many residents will want to come back after the place is functional again -- and how long will that take? What about the poor, particularly; will they want to return without work and income? Can New Orleans create more jobs than it had before the disaster? Where will income grants come from for those who cannot work or find work? And what about those who have found work elsewhere at higher pay: Will they want to come back to New Orleans' lower wages, or will its employers be willing and able to pay more?
Who will provide the money and support for HUD or Louisiana and New Orleans or private enterprise to build low-income housing? Without low-income housing, not very many people will actually be able to come back. Thus, one must also ask what efforts the local business community and local power structure are likely to make to keep the poor, especially the dark-skinned ones, out of a rebuilt New Orleans. And what can be done to discourage or thwart such efforts?
Last but hardly least, will the federal government be willing to supply the money and other support for the jobs, income grants, housing, etc., that will be needed? It has been eliminating and decimating programs that serve the poor and moderate-income people for many years now. Let's answer these questions first.
And since you cannot get do very much to rid New Orleans of poverty and segregation by redesigning the city, how it is rebuilt physically does not really matter that much in the scale of things.
Historical note -- the federal urban renewal program was invented as part of the 1949 Housing Act and finally died just as the Great Society was revving up. It was widely known as Negro removal, and by that criterion was very successful. About 90 percent of the million or so low-rent dwelling units destroyed by urban renewal were occupied by African-Americans.
Isabel V. Sawhill, vice president and director of economic studies, the Brookings Institution.
Katrina may have made the poor more visible, but many people have simply given up in the fight against poverty, believing that most government programs are ineffective. The 1960s' War on Poverty was launched with high expectations and little knowledge of what would work.
Today, we know much more. We know that in the absence of safety-net programs, there would be almost twice as much poverty as there is. We know that some training and education programs serving the poor have failed while others -- high-quality preschool programs in particular -- have been much more successful. We know that the Earned Income Tax Credit and welfare reform have reduced poverty while simultaneously increasing employment. We know that housing vouchers that disperse the poor work better than housing programs that concentrate them in just a few areas.
The kind of proposals currently being advanced to assist those devastated by Katrina don't reflect this accumulated wisdom. Instead of devoting scarce resources to unproven or unsuccessful initiatives, such as enterprise zones or trailer parks, we should build on what we have learned. In addition to spending money more wisely, there's a real question about whether our newfound charitable instincts in the wake of Katrina will have any staying power. It is easy to send a one-time check to the Red Cross. It is harder to sustain programs that provide the kind of ongoing help that low-income families need to rebuild their lives.