The settler lobby has been the most effective pressure group vis-à-vis the Israeli governments, which designated the towns and villages beyond the "Green Line" (Israel's pre-1967 border) as a "high national priority" and cushioned them with tax breaks, generous subsidies and security provided by the Israeli army. But the settler movement, viewing itself as an elite group of pioneers, failed to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Israelis, which it regarded as pleasure-seeking softies. That is why, despite their impressive organizational capabilities, strong motivation and powerful leadership, the settlers have failed to recruit support beyond their immediate group of the "national religious." Only their own attended their massive demonstrations. Many Israelis decorated their cars with orange anti-disengagement ribbons but satisfied themselves with this passive protest. Despite their dislike of withdrawing unilaterally, with no Palestinian quid pro quo, they were more interested in their summer vacation than the evacuated Gaza settlers.
After all, the summer of 2005 is the best one in Israel since the outbreak of the intifada five years ago. With Palestinian attacks reduced to almost zero, Tel Aviv's beaches and hotels are full of tourists, mostly French Jews. Economic indicators are rising rapidly. And despite the massive concentration of the military and police near Gaza, and the touching newscasts from the evacuation, life elsewhere in Israel has proceeded at its usual summertime pace.
Sharon has shown a combination of cold-blooded leadership and political shrewdness, using the long preparation period to convince the public of his seriousness and determination, to replace reluctant military and security chiefs, and to push the settlers to accept the inevitability of the pullout.
Nevertheless, even after the Gaza evacuation (plus four settlements in the northern West Bank) is complete -- and assuming there are no "extreme scenarios" of violence -- the domestic confrontation will not be over. Israel is gearing up for elections, probably in early 2006, and Sharon is facing a tough political challenge, having lost the support of his Likud Party.
Since initiating the formation of Likud in 1973, shortly after his retirement from the army, Sharon has been weak on ideology. Always the pragmatist, he is a keen believer in power, rather than ideas and beliefs. Since ascending to national leadership in early 2001, Sharon has remained highly popular with the general public, knocking out his rivals in two consecutive elections, while treating the Likud as a nuisance. The party crowd favored his challenger, Binyamin ("Bibi") Netanyahu, but respected Sharon's high ratings, which eventually translated into a larger parliamentary faction. This time, however, the Likud membership turned right, with many enraged at Sharon's disengagement policy and his arrogant behavior. On Aug. 7, Netanyahu suddenly resigned from his finance minister post, citing his opposition to the Gaza disengagement. Netanyahu, who voted for the plan last year, now proclaimed that it would endanger Israel's security.
Netanyahu's resignation was an invitation to a duel, and the de facto start of the campaign season. Sharon, who had half expected Bibi's resignation, handled the crisis well at first. But then came the polls indicating that Sharon would lose in a Likud primary, but would win if he left Likud to form a "big bang" party with his fellow elder statesmen, Labor leader Shimon Peres and Tommy Lapid, chairman of the centrist Shinui party. Sharon has vowed to remain in Likud and fight Netanyahu for its leadership, but no political analyst in Israel is betting on it, despite the poor track record of politicians who have left the major parties to launch competitors.
Will Sharon succeed in keeping his job? It is too early to tell. In assessing the possibilities, one should remember that no Israeli prime minister has ever retired happily. Of Sharon's 10 predecessors, two died while in office, and all the rest were humiliated by electoral defeats, an angry party, public rejection or self-imposed exile. Even David Ben Gurion, Israel's founding father and Sharon's mentor, was eventually expelled from his party. On the other hand, Sharon has shown unmatched ability to rise from excruciating defeats in his military and political careers.
The coming political season in Israel, and the parallel January election for the Palestinian Legislative Council, mean that the Gaza withdrawal will be followed by an impasse. While most of the world expects Israel to follow suit in the West Bank, they will have to wait, as election campaigns are traditionally full of nationalistic propaganda and right-wing posturing. Only when the political picture on both sides is clarified will there be a new opportunity for progress. Needless to say, if Sharon loses or his disengagement is perceived as a failure, the chances of Israel's making another move will be severely diminished.
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