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Monday, Nov 23, 2009
Pakistani officials at the time denied my assertions in absolute terms. After handing over around 500 Taliban immediately after the end of the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan managed to turn over a slow trickle of al-Qaida operatives to the United States once every few months. Yet most of these early detainees, held at the U.S. prison at Guantánamo, were foot soldiers with little knowledge of al-Qaida's wider network or its methods.
Pakistan is the only U.S. ally that does not allow the U.S. Central Command to post details of joint operations as well as costs paid to Pakistan on Centcom's Web site. Yet Pakistan's ability to produce al-Qaida figures at politically opportune moments has been widely noted in the U.S. media, so it is natural for skeptics to wonder whether there is a political angle to the more recent admission of local al-Qaida links and the spate of arrests of suspected terrorists in Pakistan.
Whether or not the Bush administration is using its ties with Pakistani intelligence for political purposes, the timing of Pakistan's stepped-up anti-terrorist effort, and the high-level publicity given to it, have led to similar questions about Musharraf's intentions in domestic politics. The general had promised to take off his military uniform by the end of the year, and Bush administration officials were hoping to use that as a fig leaf for touting the regime as having completed its "transition" to civilian, democratic rule. If Musharraf instead decides not to relinquish his role as chief of the army, he needs to demonstrate his indispensability in the war against terrorism with renewed vigor. That way he might be able to avert the criticism that would be certain to come his way for breaking his promise to give up his uniform.
The relative transparency of the U.S. political system should make it difficult for U.S. officials to be blatant about linking political agendas to a national security issue such as the war against terrorism. In an article titled "July Surprise?" in the New Republic, published several weeks before the Democratic Convention, John B. Judis, Spencer Ackerman and Massoud Ansari wrote of pressure on Pakistan by the Bush administration to produce a "high-value target" around the time of the convention to steal Kerry's thunder. The suggestion was rejected by some as a conspiracy theory at the time, but when Pakistan announced the arrest of Ghailani, a Tanzanian, in Gujarat, Pakistan, hours before Kerry's acceptance speech, eyebrows were raised even among those Americans who normally dismiss such conspiracy theories.
For the Bush administration to have risked playing politics with the timing of arrest of terror suspects is a disturbing enough possibility. More disturbing is the prospect that the initiative to gain political advantage from these arrests came not from the Bush administration but from the Musharraf regime. By subcontracting the hunt for bin Laden to an authoritarian ally who has a special interest in the flow of economic and military benefits resulting from this contract, the administration may be giving that ally a powerful say in America's political agenda whose effect is to undermine the war against al-Qaida.
Musharraf's enlistment in the war on terrorism is an extension of Pakistan's long-established willingness to be useful to the United States for the "right price." Pakistan's first military ruler, Gen. (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan (who ruled from 1958 to 1969), told U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade as early as 1953, "Our army can be your army if you want us." Ever since, Pakistan's military leadership has seen its alliance with America as its meal ticket.
Pakistan now receives $700 million annually in bilateral economic and military assistance, $84 million monthly to defer costs incurred in its anti-terrorist efforts and $1.7 billion in funds from international financial institutions, where U.S. support is crucial. Pakistan has also benefited from debt rescheduling and streamlining of remittances from overseas Pakistani workers. This significant cash inflow has enabled the government to balance its books, create an impression of economic growth and get back in the market for new weapons for the military. As in the past, the economic component of the U.S. aid package is aimed more at ensuring regime survival than at sustained economic growth or real democratic reform.
To understand the priorities of the Musharraf regime (and the Bush administration), one need only consider that while the United States has agreed to provide $30 million for madrasa (Islamic seminary) reform and $4 million for "training of parliamentarians," Pakistan's military is to get $350 million of the bilateral aid package of $700 million. Pakistani madrasas -- which educate over 1 million students from ages 6 to 22 -- are believed to be a source of Islamic jihadists because of their fundamentalist curriculum, and weaning the seminaries from religious radicalism is a major U.S. policy priority. However, the regular payments to Pakistan for costs incurred in fighting terrorism on America's behalf (which add up to almost $1 billion per year) go almost exclusively into the budget for Pakistan's military and intelligence services.
As long as the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains a single-issue alliance based on the quid pro quo of changes in Pakistani policy for U.S. money, the regime in Islamabad will continue to be tempted to take its time in finding all the terrorists at large in Pakistan. After all, most subcontractors who are paid by the hour take longer to get the job done. And while this may seem like a risky scheme for Musharraf, it conforms to the past pattern of Pakistani military regimes collecting rent from the United States for providing strategic services.
