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Monday, Nov 23, 2009
In May 2003, right after Bush declared his "mission accomplished," Jordan announced -- without mentioning the trade, of course -- to lawyers representing the Saudi prisoners and, hence, to the Saudi public that the five would be handed over to the Saudi government. This apparently gave just the right public message for Abdullah, diverting his nation's anger at his not taking an even harder line against the American occupation of Iraq. It showed that Abdullah could extract concessions from America on the delicate subject of the 200 Saudi jihadists captured in Afghanistan (the Saudis call them relief workers; the United States calls them terrorists) -- something no one else in the world at that time had the power to do.
Strikingly, the press reports of the deal make clear that Jordan himself proposed and then pushed hard for it. The deal required overcoming strong Defense Department resistance, some initially from Rumsfeld himself, not to mention resistance from the CIA and the Justice Department. Very possibly, had anyone but Bush's personal lawyer sponsored the proposal, the merest hint of trading captured terrorists for hostages taken and tortured by an ostensibly friendly regime would have elicited bitter and unyielding resistance.
As it is, on July 13, the Senate Democratic leadership wrote President Bush to get his answers to a series of very tough questions about the deal, bluntly asking, "Did Robert Jordan, our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, propose to senior State Department officials that the release of Saudi terrorism suspects be linked to the Saudi release of British subjects?"
Considering the timing of the hostages-for-terrorists swap, Jordan may have lobbied for the swap in late 2002 and early 2003, just when he was also addressing the details of the upcoming Prince Sultan Air Base closure. He could have justified both, as only the president's personal lawyer could do effectively, as implementing Bush's own strongly held desire to make Riyadh feel rewarded for "supporting" the Iraq invasion.
In the Bush administration's line, the Saudis' unhelpfulness in the many months after 9/11 can be viewed as a temporary expedient that got cleansed away once al-Qaida began attacking foreign targets within the kingdom in July 2003. After all, thereafter Saudi security forces began a crackdown on those directly participating in al-Qaida, and Abdullah implemented a limited version of his much-touted reforms. In this there is some truth but also a great deal of Bush-Saudi spin.
The U.S. occupation of Iraq continues to arouse fury at all Saudi levels, high and low, greatly increasing America's vulnerability to additional terror attacks. Although al-Qaida's violence within the kingdom is not condoned by the Saudi regime, the intense anger among the powerful-as-ever religious extremists there does not bode well for our national security. And when the Iraq occupation is added to other grievances, the United States is likely seen by many as deserving the sting of what is deemed, in the wake of an invasion of another Islamic country, a defensive jihad. The United States stands suspected of crushing the Sunnis (who enjoy Saudi Wahhabi sympathy) in Fallujah, Iraq, a place where Saudi nationals currently train in terror. Equally blameworthy, the United States stands suspected of making an alliance with Iraq's majority Shiites (very much lacking in Saudi Wahhabi sympathy), who threaten to achieve, by America's efforts, unwonted power. As for what were modest proposals for democratic and anti-extremist reforms in the first place, Abdullah has disappointingly cut way back on even the small degree of political reform America had good reason to get for what it traded.
Although the White House has denied that the Saudis gave Jordan the boot in 2003, citing personal reasons for his recall as ambassador, overseas sources shed some light on what may be the actual reasons. In spring 2003, Jordan reportedly spoke frankly and, hence, indiscreetly about the Saudi succession at Saudi dinner parties. He said that not only did America want Abdullah in charge when King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz dies but, more important, that, after Abdullah, it wanted to skip the rest of his generation and have the next generation take over. This was a direct attack on Prince Sultan, the defense minister, and Prince Nayef, two powerful brothers of Abdullah's who would thereby get passed over.
On Sept. 25, 2003, the right-wing Washington Times -- in a surprising contradiction of the White House's assertion a few days later that Jordan was departing "for personal reasons" -- reported that "Saudi Arabia has demanded the removal of U.S. Ambassador Robert Jordan." Some sources say Bandar (who just happens to be Prince Sultan's son) discussed the removal with Bush that August. Another longtime Bush friend, a prominent Republican oil lobbyist from Texas famous for keeping the public completely in the dark about his moves, took his place.
Jordan clearly goofed by talking about the Saudi succession without the requisite diplomatic cover. But since Abdullah was partial to Bush -- and presumably in sympathy with Jordan's comments -- the ambassador might have survived his faux pas, especially considering that al-Qaida's attacks in the kingdom in July 2003 made Saudis more sympathetic to the American position. It was Saudis' rage over the occupation of Iraq that weakened Abdullah's position, forcing him to yield to his brothers and kick Jordan out.
The Bush administration's patient exculpation of the Saudi role in 9/11, and above all its closure of the giant Saudi air base, should have strengthened America's hand with the kingdom on vital matters. But Bush did not use this source of leverage well: He failed to get in return a real Saudi commitment to ending jihadist incitement and implementing domestic reforms. The fresh waves of ill will against America generated by Bush's go-it-alone invasion dissipated whatever goodwill had been gained. In the end, Bush's diplomatic dance with the Saudis, combined with his bungled occupation of Iraq, made America less safe from terror attacks, not more.
