Dean has long relied on a very tight circle of close advisors who have ably served him, headed by his longtime aides and confidantes, Kate O'Connor and Bob Rogan. But if Dean could not see the need for some outside help -- or, worse, if he recognized the need for help but couldn't bring himself to ask for it -- he has only himself to blame. In a cheeky Washington Post opinion piece a month ago, Marjorie Williams says she only fully understood Dean's demeanor when she remembered that Dean is a doctor. However good Trippi's advice to Dean may have been, the doctor should have sought a second opinion.

Dean's second error was his failure to continue the steady and successful evolution of his candidacy. Throughout most of 2003, Dean demonstrated an uncanny mix of political gumption and presumption. When nobody knew who he was, Dean behaved as if he belonged onstage with the better-known candidates, and soon enough he was legitimate contender. When critics doubted his ability to raise money, Dean outpaced them all, often cumulatively, and without competing for the $2,000 checks the others relied on. When cynics questioned his ability to garner union support or political endorsements, he surprised everybody with one press conference after another to announce his growing roster of supporters. Dean partly became the front-runner because he acted as if he deserved to be.

Once he reached the front of the pack, however, Dean's one-stage-ahead-of-himself progression began to stall. By mid-autumn 2003, instead of exhibiting the subtle moves of a future nominee, Dean was stuck. He should have transformed himself, by moving simply from diagnoses of what was wrong with the Democratic Party and the current administration to prognoses. Only in the week between Iowa and New Hampshire did Dean return to the themes of fiscal management and his healthcare successes in Vermont, but it was too late. (And his televised "scream" drowned out his new -- or, rather, original -- message.)

By the time of the Iowa caucuses, Dean's insurgent talk was not only redundant for those already supporting him, it clearly turned off many of the anybody-but-Bush Democrats still shopping around for what they hoped would be the party's most electable candidate. The most telling statistic heading into Iowa came from a Zogby poll showing Dean fourth -- with just 13 percent -- behind Kerry, Edwards and Gephardt as the second-choice candidate among Iowans who preferred somebody else. With all due respect to Paul Begala, who told me in the Val Air Ballroom that he believes Dean faltered because he lost his insurgent's edge, Dean's fall was precipitated by his failure to lose that edge sooner and start acting more like the nominee he aspired to be.

Dean's third major error was to continue emphasizing his antiwar position above all his other positions. Dean deserves credit for showing the courage to criticize President George W. Bush about Iraq when others were too timid to do so. Though many Democrats eventually arrived at the same conclusions as Dean about the war, polls from autumn 2002 indicate that many Democrats did not start where Dean started. Put another way, the evolving views of many Democrats on the Iraq issue more closely mirror the political journey of Kerry or Edwards.

The conventional wisdom is that a "dated Dean, married Kerry" buyer's remorse sank Dean. It's an apt concept but wrongly applied. If Dean's steadfastness on Iraq evokes buyer's remorse among mainstream Democrats, it's because Dean reminds them that they bought Bush's justifications for invading Iraq and now regret it. Kerry's evolution may have been purely opportunist; indeed, his tough talk on Iraq came only after Dean proved it was politically viable. But Kerry's fickleness became an unexpected blessing because his shifting stance has affirmed many voters' feelings about the war, whereas Dean's consistent and insistent opposition may create an uncomfortable dissonance.

What happens to Dean if his long-shot Wisconsin-Michigan-Washington strategy fails and Kerry (or Edwards) captures the nomination?

Dean says he will fall in line behind whomever the Democrats nominate and will encourage his loyalists to do the same. If Kerry is smart, he will avoid the temptation to respond to Dean's attacks and instead reach out to Dean's supporters. After all, in many ways Dean made the nomination a more attractive prize by almost single-handedly picking up a defeated Democratic Party, dusting it off, and putting it squarely into the national partisan fight again. The painful irony for Dean is that he is unlikely to get the chance to be the Democrats' man in the ring for that fight.

On "Meet the Press," Dean noted grudgingly that the other campaigns have stolen or borrowed his themes. He and Trippi knew they had created something special. It's a shame they didn't quite know what to do with it.

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