Coalition of the billing -- or unwilling?

Although the current Bush administration vehemently denies it, bribery is not abnormal U.S. foreign policy. In "The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992," former Secretary of State James Baker writes frankly of his coercive role in the U.N. Security Council vote authorizing the Gulf War in 1990. "I met personally with all my Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening, and occasionally buying votes," he recalled. "Such are the politics of diplomacy."

White House press spokesman Ari Fleischer tried to argue at a Feb. 25 news briefing that the current administration is above such venal forms of persuasion. "You're saying that the leaders of other nations are buyable," he sniffed. "And that is not an acceptable proposition." The Washington press corps literally laughed him out of the room.

The fine art of quid pro quo is not just about foreign aid. Cameroon and Guinea are both eligible for preferential access to U.S. markets through the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act enacted in 2000 -- provided they do ''not engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security of foreign policy interests.'' Voting against the U.N. resolution could result in loss of U.S. preferential status, but voting for it would almost certainly sour relations with France, a top trading partner and primary lender for many West African nations.

For Angola, which did not qualify for the growth and opportunity act because of an anti-corruption clause, future eligibility is one of several issues at stake. Angola exports more oil to the United States than Kuwait, and future International Monetary Fund loans for developing that critical industry may pivot on its vote. Angola's U.N. Ambassador, Ismael Gasper Martins, has remarked coyly about his country's position. ''For a long time now, we have been asking for help to rebuild our country after years of war," he said recently. "No one is tying the request to support on Iraq, but it is all happening at the same time." On Feb. 20, the U.S. Agency for International Development approved $15.4 million in annual aid for the war-ravaged country, which France is unlikely to match.

Even Mexico, normally a firm ally, has been pressured over its unwillingness to line up in the yes column. On a recent trip to Mexico, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned that Washington would be "very unhappy" if Mexico voted no at the U.N., and unnamed U.S. diplomats have been widely quoted as saying that a "No" vote could "stir up feelings" against Mexicans in the United States. For Mexico, which sends 80 percent of its exports to the U.S. market, the economic and social consequences of a no vote seem dire.

Oman, Jordan and Bahrain are militarily dependent on the U.S. through arms purchases and training. "New Europe" countries in line for NATO membership -- such as Albania, Estonia and Romania -- face the possibility that the U.S. could block them from joining.

If the muck of diplomacy more frequently displays Machiavellian than Wilsonian ethics, that's nothing new. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development website, "U. S. foreign assistance has always had the twofold purpose of furthering America's foreign policy interests in expanding democracy and free markets while improving the lives of the citizens of the developing world." Pragmatically, USAID's first emphases were on countering the spread of communism, particularly the influence of the People's Republic of China.

The idea that anyone would consider such naked haggling unethical is "ridiculous," according to Danielle Pletka, a scholar at the Washington-based American Enterprise Institute and former Republican staffer on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 1990s."Foreign aid is not charity," she said in an interview. "There are costs of going to war, and there are costs of siding against the U.S. At the end of the day, they'll do what's in their best interest."

But the scope of available options for checkbook diplomacy has just increased dramatically. In the first major change to the distribution of foreign assistance since the Kennedy administration four decades ago, President Bush last month submitted to Congress his plan for the Millennium Challenge Account, which links foreign aid to "performance markers" to be determined by U.S. administrators. "To be eligible for this new assistance, countries must demonstrate commitment to three standards -- ruling justly, investing in their people, and encouraging economic freedom," Bush said in his message to Congress.

The accompanying budget request of $20 billion -- beginning with $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2004 and stabilizing at $5 billion per year by 2006 -- translates to a lot more diplomatic horsepower. "It is clear that this administration has taken development off the back burner and placed it squarely at the forefront of our foreign policy," said Andrew S. Natsios, USAID administrator, before the House International Relations Committee on last week.

And even if the U.S. persuasions are insufficient to win a war authorization in the Security Council, Bush has made clear that it will have the backing of a "large coalition of the willing." Although the White House refuses to release a list of these allies, administration officials approximate that about 40 countries are involved. "There are many ways to form international coalitions," Fleischer explained Monday. "The United Nations Security Council is but one of them."

Next Page: A long list of beneficiaries, some more willing than others

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