The current impasse between the U.S. and its European counterparts can be traced back to the original U.N. Resolution 1441, which passed to much acclaim in November. The declaration insisted Iraq open its weapons programs and cooperate with the inspectors for the first time in four years, or it would face "serious consequences" -- code words for war.

At the time, the press played up the 15-0 vote among the Security Council as a diplomatic coup for the U.S., which somehow was convinced the French and Russians saw things from the American point of view.

But today's diplomatic morass was foreshadowed just hours after the resolution passed, when French and American officials came to surprisingly different conclusions about what it actually meant. Throughout the negotiations, the French had been insistent that the proclamation not contain a "hidden trigger" that allowed the U.S. to unilaterally declare war in the name of the United Nations the moment that Washington, and not the Security Council, deemed Saddam in "material breach" of the inspection regime.

The French, as well as the Russian and the Chinese, wanted to make sure the U.N. still played a key role after a resolution was passed. Last fall, French diplomats suggested a two-step approach: The U.N. would vote to send inspectors back, and then would have to vote again to authorize war.

That provided a framework for the final agreement, though France's two-step approach was folded into an extended one-step version. In other words, according to 1441, the Security Council would immediately reconvene to decide on war if Blix found Iraq to be in "material breach" of the disarmament resolution. And even if he did not uncover any dramatic findings, Blix was ordered to update the U.N. in person 60 days after the inspectors went to Iraq. That way, argued European diplomats, the United States was still bound to work through the U.N.

Within hours of 1441's passage, the White House made it clear that the U.S. in no way felt obliged to win passage of a second Security Council resolution in order to go to war and would go it alone, if need be.

If Iraq defies the resolution, warned Secretary of State Colin Powell on Nov. 10, "the U.N. will come together and act if military force is required. But if the U.N. is unwilling or unable to act, then the United States is prepared to act. And the president has made this clear."

"It was a classic diplomatic fudge," says Rodman at Colby College. "Two parties don't agree, so they agree to language that can be interpreted differently by different parties and hope the two sides will eventually agree." Singer concurs: "The reason everybody in the U.N. thought 1441 was such a great agreement was it avoided war," says Singer. "But the reason the U.S. thought it was great was it provided a case for war."

The fundamental difference wouldn't have mattered if Iraq had blatantly interfered with the inspection process, as it often did in the 1990s, or if inspectors had uncovered banned weapons programs. at that point the Security Council, with France and Russia's blessing, would have likely agreed to a second war resolution.

But Iraq's passive cooperation and the inspection team's inability to uncover a "smoking gun" has only highlighted the initial friction. "Fig leafs cover up important things," says Reiss, referring to the 1441 compromise.

Unlike France, Germany does not have veto power in the Security Council, so is not as important in the game of diplomacy now being played. And France, while arguing against waging an invasion right now, has been careful not to rule out supporting a second U.N. resolution for war. Some observers suggest Paris is simply playing hardball as a way to increase the price Washington will pay to get the French back on the war bandwagon.

That's why the U.S. has not given up on the U.N., with talk that the White House will try to pressure its critics by introducing a second resolution to the Security Council, in effect daring another country to veto authorization for war at a time when Saddam clearly has failed to disclose all of his weapons of mass destruction or to account for weapons that he once had.

Nonetheless, the White House would probably prefer to play brinksmanship with Saddam, not the U.N.

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