So it's a question of Western perspective ...

Yeah, Asians look exotic. And Kim Jong Il loves fast cars and high fashion, all these things, so I think the media hypes the image of him as a scandalous leader. By painting him that way, by making him look like just a crazy, irrational leader, the media creates even more misunderstanding among the American population. If you look at the U.K. royal family, they're even more bizarre than Kim Jong Il. Journalists need to ask more serious questions, rather than focus on his personality and inclinations. The only [crazy] thing that he did was his state-sponsored terrorism -- sending out agents [with] bombs so that the world would not show up for the South Korea Summer Olympics. That's a little crazy.

But why would a poor country spend so much money on missiles?

North Korean missile development is not about blasting the world, but about military deterrence, because it's a very weak, isolated, lonely country that nobody likes. And nuclear weapons are the poor man's bomb. Conventional weapon development costs a lot of money, but if you're a nuclear power you're suddenly special, and your image is one of a mighty power that nobody would like to touch. In a sense you can be a very safe porcupine, without worrying about being attacked. North Koreans think this is a nice way of protecting their regime, although Americans don't translate it that way. I don't think that anyone's interested in North Korea's longevity, because it's a bad country with a bad dictator. But if the leadership and the nation have this kind of power, then the whole game of strategy is different. In that sense the North Korean nuclear issue is not just a bluff or a bargaining tool.

Does our current foreign policy reflect an understanding of all of that?

U.S. foreign policy in Asia has always been written by events, by crisis. There's never been a long-term strategy for truly understanding the culture and history of individual countries. We do well with China and Japan, because they're such major countries, but we tend to leapfrog the Korean peninsula and you can imagine our contentious attitude toward understanding the North Koreans. Until my book came out, no one had written a comprehensive history of North Korea.

U.S. policy makers usually don't give a damn about understanding North Korea. The best example is in 1994, when I was working for the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, and I was involved in the policy process. I was telling the government elite that you've got to understand the mindset and cultural background of North Korea. Only then will you know how to negotiate and understand what kind of framework you're signing for. But they completely ignored that kind of advice, and now we see a repetition of the same crisis. As long as we keep that kind of attitude, there will be numerous other crises waiting for us. Believe me.

What's the minimum Americans need to know about North Korean culture and history to understand this crisis?

Well, I think that the average American in Kansas may not even distinguish that there are two Koreas. The amazing thing is that when the South Korean delegation, our allies, arrived in D.C., some of the government security people who weren't very well-educated asked, "What Korea are you from?" That's the level of overall awareness of the global situation.

It's common sense that before we try to engage North Korea on missile issues, we need to have a bare minimum understanding of their society and culture. Secondly, we have to listen to regional policy makers -- what South Korea is saying, what Japan is saying -- and engage in some kind of consensus building through serious consultation, rather than assume we are the one who dictates the course of the action.

Can you compare the way the Clinton and Bush administrations have handled North Korea?

There is a huge difference. The Clinton administration used the word "engagement" -- engagement and dialogue were the basic model. Bush [has emphasized] containment, deterrence, and vigilant observation of what North Korea is doing.

I was involved during the Clinton era. I think they were a little too relaxed after 1994, a little too sure that things were under control. There were criticisms in 1998, a feeling that we have to have IAEA [the International Atomic Energy Agency] push inspections to find out what's going on in North Korea. In that sense I think the Clinton administration's rather romantic treatment of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction is the predecessor of today's problem.

But President Bush's rhetoric is sometimes too simply stated and too harsh.

In what way?

His moralistic judgments, "axis of evil," us vs. them, are very black and white. Those kinds of descriptions are not creating any positive response from the region, even from European Union members, in dealing with the crisis. In that sense I think glib-tongued President Clinton managed to talk about North Korea more smoothly. President Bush is creating more problems, more conflict, potential friction even with his allies.

What should President Bush do?

Today? Well, he's not making a lot of statements other than we won't attack North Korea, don't worry about it. But water was already spilled, in a sense. I think his "axis of evil" speech is the permanent image people have of him, as a morally righteous president demanding the world to be either with us or against us. That sentiment is widely shared, but the biblical terminology of "you are evil, so by implication we are not" is not conducive to building consensus in Asia on policy issues, particularly in the post 9/11 era.

What do South Koreans want?

South Korea has a deep dilemma. It's unlike the Cold War days. During the Cold War, South Korea felt North Korea posed a great threat, but gradually South Korea became an economic power and they saw North Koreans who were hungry, constantly begging for international food aid. The threat perception is changing very rapidly. They saw North Koreans as hungry brothers and sisters suffering under the dictatorship. The dictatorship is hated, but nonetheless its people are victims of the system. Many younger-generation South Koreans who grew up in the post-Korean War or post-Cold War era treat North Koreans as starving family members rather than a threat. They don't think nuclear missiles will be exploding the next day. Many of them think that the development of nuclear missiles is kind of like a survival tool, for military deterrence, to bargain for export items. So as a stalwart ally of the U.S., South Korea is between a rock and a hard place.

Is there an immediate military risk?

I don't think North Korean leaders are stupid enough to bring the nuclear threat on themselves, unless they felt they were pushed into a corner.

Other than not pushing North Korea into a corner, what should the U.S. do?

Let the world be a part of the decision-making process. It's already been brought to the U.N., and we need to work in concert with them and the regional powers.

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