Still, even for those accustomed to Bush's tactic of defining paleolithic conservatism ever further down (to pervert Daniel Patrick Moynihan's phrase), the Abrams appointment was a shocker. With war against Iraq looming, everyone knows that the U.S. needs to avoid exacerbating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the short term, and move to resolve it in the long term. Moreover, after the GOP's triumph in the midterm elections, some thought that Bush might feel that domestic political constraints had lifted enough for him to be able to turn the heat up slightly on Sharon. The U.S. is reportedly going to press Sharon soon to take two initial steps: stop building settlements and release blocked funds to the Palestinian Authority to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. With the U.S.-backed "road map" for peace on the table, Washington has an obvious interest in the peace process going forward as expeditiously as possible.

Considering these factors, it seemed at least possible -- although it would have violated all precedent -- that Bush would throw the long-suffering State Department a bone and appoint someone to the crucial NSC post without an egregious pro-Israel tilt. Why would Bush choose a critic of the peace process at the very moment when its implementation was an urgent priority? But as has become increasingly obvious ever since Bush took office, his is the most ideologically extreme and monolithic administration in modern times. Only those who subscribe to the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Rice-Bush ideology need apply. Which means that advising the president on perhaps the most crucial conflict in the world -- the one that has inflamed Arabs and Muslims everywhere against the U.S., the one upon whose fair and just resolution our very fate, and the rest of the world's, may depend -- is a neoconservative hard-liner.

The Abrams appointment throws into sharp relief the split between the ascendant White House and an ever more marginalized and emasculated State Department. According to an article by Herb Keinon in the Jerusalem Post, Sharon took the appointment of Abrams as a signal that the White House was prepared to abandon the "road map" to peace. Sharon, according to the article, always suspected that the "road map" was a State Department initiative, not a White House one. As a result, in a major speech on Dec. 4, he took a harder line than the "road map" stipulated, insisting that the Palestinians would have to fulfill their obligations (the removal of Arafat, reform of security, complete cessation of violence) before Israel would begin to uphold its end of the bargain. In effect, Sharon was gambling that Bush would be willing to junk the road map -- which merely called on the Palestinians to begin meeting their obligations -- and return to the position he took in the hard-line June speech in which he said no peace process was possible until Arafat was kicked out.

The Abrams appointment is clearly a slap in the face to the State Department and to Powell, who has been the sole voice of regionalist wisdom in the Bush administration's army of warriors against global terror. What it means for U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, to say the least, not encouraging. The most benign interpretation of the move is that Bush, in Nixon-in-China fashion, appointed a pro-Israeli figure to give himself political cover to lean on Sharon. "If anybody can now push Israel on the settlements issue, it is Elliott Abrams," writes Keinon. "His support for Israel is such that no one will question his motives if he asks as he surely will for a complete cessation of settlement construction, including natural growth, in all the settlements."

Maybe, though it's a little hard to understand why the most pro-Israel administration in history would feel it necessary to throw yet another sop to avert the expected yowling from Congress and AIPAC. In any case, the long-term implications of the hire are far more significant than any short-term political calculations. What the Abrams hire seems to indicate is that the Bush administration has thrown its lot in, at least for now, with Ariel Sharon's vision of the peace process -- which means no peace, because under Sharon's terms, the "road map" will lead nowhere. The fact is that the Palestinians will never negotiate under such conditions, as Sharon and everyone in Israel knows full well. Since Bush and his advisors also know this, they must believe either that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be resolved -- at least not at a domestic political price they would be willing to pay -- or that invading Iraq will solve everything, will cut through the Gordian Knot, will force the Palestinians to finally cry uncle.

The first belief is cynical and brutal. It is more likely that the Bush administration believes -- or are closing their eyes and hoping to believe -- the second. But the dream of an Iraq magic bullet is a completely speculative hypothesis, one that could backfire, or result in completely different results.

This is not an exercise at a neoconservative war-gaming group. The United States is moving toward a war that could redefine our relations -- perhaps for good, more likely for ill -- with the one group of people in the world who have demonstrated a religiously backed desire to destroy us. And as it does so, it appears to be preparing to take the hardest possible line on the conflict that has fueled that desire to destroy. For the old Cold War crusaders who make up Bush's inner sanctum, this may feel stirring and glorious, the trumpet call of a battle between good and evil. For those who do not share their beliefs, it may sound more like Judgment Day.

Recent Stories