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Friday, Jul 10, 2009
The terror attack in the world's most populous Muslim nation could stir up rage against Islamic extremists, says an expert. But if the U.S. invades Iraq, all bets are off.
Oct 16, 2002 | Last weekend's deadly terrorist attack on the island of Bali thrust Indonesia to the forefront of the war on terrorism. Officials suspect al-Qaida played a role in the car bombing that leveled a popular tourist nightclub and killed nearly 200. It was the deadliest terrorist attack since Sept. 11, 2001.
The most populous Muslim nation in the world, Indonesia for decades has been known for its moderate population, often standing in stark contrast to Muslim countries in the Middle East. But with the ouster of longtime dictator Suharto and a succession of weak elected presidents, radical conservative Muslims led by Abu Bakar Baasyir have been crusading in recent years to establish Islamic law in Indonesia.
Repressed under Suharto's rule, the Islamists have used Indonesia's economic misery -- and some al-Qaida-inspired terrorism -- to galvanize public support. They have had scant success: Though 88 percent of Indonesians are Muslim, 1999 election returns showed radical Muslims enjoyed very little support. Still, before last weekend's terrorist attack, Indonesia's rulers had been reluctant to criticize the radicals for fear of stirring up resentment among the masses.
In an interview Monday, Robert Hefner, a Boston University professor, Indonesia expert and author of "Civil Islam," dissected the Bali terrorist attack -- its effect on the struggle for Indonesia, and the larger impact on the war on terrorism.
Was it an opening blast in a bloody fight for an Islamic state in Indonesia, and yet another front for al-Qaida? Or was it a miscalculation that will shock Indonesian moderates, including public officials, into action and mark the end of the Islamists' crusade?
Hefner argues that moderate Muslims would never allow Indonesia to become an Islamic state, and that Abu Bakar Baasyir may soon be under house arrest. But he cites one complicating factor that could give Indonesian radicals political cover in coming months: likely U.S. plans to invade Iraq and the backlash it would create among Muslims in the Southeast Asian country.
What's the significance of the weekend's events in Bali, other than the obvious massive loss of life? How important is this as a marker in what's unfolding in Indonesia?
It's significant as an index of a very bitter struggle between the forces of political moderation in the Muslim community, which is very large, vs. forces of a conservative, hard-line Islamism, which has skillfully used the political and economic crisis that's shaken Indonesia since 1998 to press its case to its advantage. This event in Bali is I think going to crystallize this intramural contest in Indonesia and force many fence-sitters in the Muslim community to decide which side they're on. Not the side as far as U.S. international policy goes. But the more critical question in Indonesia itself is the struggle between the moderate majority and the much smaller but very effectively organized radical Islamist wing.
Wouldn't the Bali attack create a backlash against what the radicals are trying to accomplish?
It all depends on who is revealed to be behind it. Many people -- and myself as well -- suspect it is al-Qaida linked to some domestic group.
Who are the likely domestic contenders?
The most likely contender by far would be some faction of the Jamaah Islamiyyah. But Jamaah Islamiyyah itself, just like al-Qaida, must be thought of as more of a coalition, and a kind of fractious coalition at that. It could well be a faction in the Jamaah Islamiyyah that has taken responsibility for this action on their own. Or it could be a like-minded group, in agreement with its broad goals, but a group decided to take initiative on its own without compromising the position of the Jamaah Islamiyyah in general.
Does Jamaah Islamiyyah want to be a viable political player in Indonesia -- meaning it would want a certain amount of deniability -- or are they a radical group and they don't care if they're tied publicly to a terrorist attack?
Certainly there are figures within the Jamaah Islamiyyah who are sufficiently extremist that they really are intent on destabilizing the country. And that includes doing great damage to the Indonesian economy on the assumption that that will eventually accelerate the pace of radical, indeed revolutionary, change. There are others who are certainly radical, but their radicalism lies in their dedication to this utopian ideal of realizing Islamic law on earth. Some of them would have misgivings about the kinds of things we've seen over the last few days.
It's important to emphasize there are aboveground groups, one of which goes by the name MMI, the Council of Islamic Fighters. And some of its leaders do aspire to political office and want to form a political party. Abu Bakar Baasyir is the head of the MMI and the accused head, and I think that accusation is right, of the Jamaah Islamiyyah. A very interesting and complex man. Somebody who has a good deal of charisma and very savvy politically.
The U.S. had wanted him arrested months ago, correct?
Yes, but it's not just the U.S., and I think that's very important from an Asian perspective. Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines wanted him arrested too.
Was he ever close to being arrested? Was there a crystallizing event where everyone said, 'My God, you have to arrest him for doing X and Y'? Or was it a general feeling that he was mounting something dangerous?
He has not been close to being arrested. But when you look back to December 2001, you'll see the Indonesian minister of defense at that time had already made a number of statements that there were international terrorists in Indonesia, and that they had ties to domestic groups, and that it was time for Indonesia to take action against these domestic terrorists. What was interesting is that he failed miserably because he in effect was tarred and feathered as a stooge for the United States. And out of that incident Abu Bakar Baasyir began to rise in prominence by skillfully playing the nationalist card by arguing that the minster of defense was compromising the national integrity of Indonesia.
What was the lesson there?
There have been many people in the government who wanted to take action against terrorism in Indonesia, but have been unable to because of the weak nature of President Megawati Sukarnoputri's government, and the vulnerability, in particular, to the accusation that it's selling Indonesia for the interest of the United States.
