Friday, Sep 5, 2008
And yet Niaz Naik, even when confronted with all of these denials, refuses to budge. Could he have misinterpreted the extent of the threat? Could the Americans have been speaking without Bush approval? Naik dismisses all of these possibilities. He still insists that the Americans threatened the Taliban, per Bush's orders.
Brisard and Dasquie have a lot of faith in Naik's story. "Whether we rely on Naik's testimony or the former U.S. ambassador's [Simons], which doesn't necessarily contradict Naik's, one has to focus on the Pakistani representatives' knowledge regarding the statement," they write in "Forbidden Truth." "It is clear that in July 2001, a U.S. representative, speaking in an informal meeting, but mandated by their government to do so, in specific or general terms, whether mischievous or not, whether drunk or not, evoked the option of a military threat against Afghanistan."
Even now, Brisard believes that there's more than enough evidence to justify the assertion that a threat was made. While he and Dasquie admit to making several changes to the book -- largely downplaying their previous claim that there was a direct link between the July threat and the Sept. 11 attacks -- Brisard harbors no doubt about the threat. "We have material proofs, direct quotes from the participants [saying] that it happened, and that economic considerations were discussed," he says.
But other analysts insist Naik's comments must be seen in context. His agenda has to be understood within the shadowy world of Pakistani politics -- which no one seems entirely able to understand. Was he close to Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)? Was he exaggerating the U.S. threat to push his government away from supporting the Taliban? Or did he simply want attention?
Once again, it depends on whom you believe.
Shaheen Sehbai, former editor of The News, a large newspaper in Pakistan, says that Naik "was known to be a career diplomat, a professional from a family full of brilliant people who rose to the top of their careers."
Ahmed Rashid, author of "The Taliban," calls him a "sober diplomat with a sound record who does not speak out much to the press."
Even the Americans generally agree that Naik is an unlikely liar. Coldren describes him as "a quintessential diplomat" and "a milquetoast." In September, Simons told the British Guardian: "I've known Naik and considered him a friend for years. He's an honorable diplomat."
Still, even many of those who respect Naik believe he somehow botched the message he was supposed to have received from the Americans. "Naik exaggerated the threat that was given to him in Berlin," says Ahmed Rashid, who believes Naik had his own unofficial, unsanctioned agenda: convincing his government of the danger of continuing to support the Taliban. Pakistan was one of the few countries to officially recognize the Taliban, which Naik felt was hurting his nation. So he exaggerated the U.S. military threat, the theory goes, because he wanted Pakistan to cut ties with the radical Muslim group. "He used it to try and frighten the army into changing policy," Rashid says. "The army had been favoring the Taliban; Naik wanted to emphasize that support could hurt the country."
This theory seems to be the most popular explanation for why Naik might have inflated the American threat. Simons says that when he asked friends and former colleagues why Naik would utter "an untruth," as he calls it, most offered the same response. "The supposition is that he was saying it in a good cause," Simons says. "In other words, he was trying to get his government to change policy."
Yet some observers of Pakistani politics insist that Naik speaks for the ISI, the Pakistani security agency whose leaders were close to the Taliban. "I have no reason to believe that he would make the wrong statement, but I have reason to believe that he would say what the government or ISI wanted him to say," says Sehbai, who recently launched a news Web site, the South Asia Tribune. There are problems with this theory; Rashid points out that Naik worked for Nawaz Sharif, a prime minister generally loathed by the intelligence services for his attempts to make peace with India.
Others say Naik has a history of exaggerating his role. "Naik is a typical Pakistani thrown to exaggeration and duplicity," says Mansour Ijaz, a Pakistani-American businessman and freelance diplomat.
Ijaz says he crossed paths with Naik when discussions of the 2000 cease-fire were being discussed. "He carried some messages back and forth between Islamabad and Delhi and got himself into quite a bit of trouble for misrepresenting what both sides were saying at that time."
But Ijaz's critics say he's the one prone to exaggeration. Last fall, he made headlines with his claim that he'd brokered a deal with Sudan that would have delivered bin Laden to U.S. hands in 1996, if the Clinton administration hadn't rejected it. But the Clinton administration says there was no deal and that Ijaz never had a role in diplomatic discussions. Ijaz's claims, according to Clinton's National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, are "ludicrous and irresponsible."
Nonetheless, Oakley and other sources confirm that Naik ran into trouble for the way he characterized the ongoing talks between India and Pakistan in 1999 and 2000. At the time, he claimed that a deal between the longstanding enemies was imminent; Naik only had to show the right maps to Indian officials, who would then sign an agreement that would end to war over Kashmir. But soon after these claims hit the Pakistani press, critics refuted Naik's assertion. And of course, no such deal was ever inked. "He played up his role as an unofficial intermediary between Sharif and [Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari] Vajpayee," Oakley says. "He claimed they almost reached this agreement. But again, I think there was a lot of exaggeration. The Indians were nowhere close to reaching an agreement." Oakley believes Naik is no more believable now.
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