Bush's Middle East Band-Aid

Last Tuesday, the "quartet" of regional peace messengers met Foreign Minister Peres for dinner at a diplomatic residence in Hertzliya. General Zinni headed the group, which includes the U.N. envoy Terje Roed-Larssen, Miguel Moratinos of the E.U. and the Russian Andrei Vodovin. The guests exchanged views on the situation. Most of them, including Peres, emphasized the need for a serious "political horizon" to stabilize the cease-fire and to serve as an incentive for the Palestinian side to halt terrorism. Zinni told the guests that he understood their concerns, but his focus now was on implementing the Tenet plan and making sure that both sides fulfilled their commitments.

Zinni's immediate concern is to get Arafat on the plane to meet Cheney next Monday in Egypt, en route to the Arab summit in Beirut. To pay for his ticket, Arafat was told he must abide by Cheney's dictated terms. He has to declare a cease-fire in Arabic, to his own people, and issue clear instructions to his security organs to enforce the cease-fire and start implementing the Tenet plan. Sharon agreed to this formula somewhat reluctantly, saving face by threatening to block Arafat's return to the territories if terror attacks continue in his absence, and if his address in Beirut amounts to "incitement" in Israeli eyes. True to form, Sharon concluded the deal with Cheney in private last Monday night, and the next day he presented his ministers with a fait accompli. Sharon said he saw the Cheney and Zinni trips as "Arafat's last chance"; he expected the Americans to issue an ultimatum to his old nemesis.

Zinni has spent the last few days working late, shuttling between Sharon and Arafat and convening Israeli and Palestinian security chiefs to discuss an agreed sequence for implementing Tenet. But even if he succeeds, the future looks gloomy. The Palestinians demand a timetable for political negotiations on final-status issues. Sharon has agreed to revive the "senior committee" dealing with political issues, and appointed Peres to head it, ignoring criticism from the right. Peres sees his appointment as a mandate to negotiate the "political horizon" and even as a forerunner to an eventual Arafat-Sharon meeting, an idea rejected for now by the prime minister. Sharon continues to oppose negotiating a permanent status deal: he sticks to his idea of a long-term armistice, which would leave large "security zones" in the West Bank under Israeli control. Such a proposal is certain to be rejected by Palestinians, who walked away from a much better offer at Camp David. Yet for Sharon, even this offer puts him in political peril. Hosting Zinni last Thursday at his ranch, Sharon complained that his concessions have put him in a political minefield. "I don't even have a majority in my own Likud Party," he told the American emissary.

Considering these factors, it isn't surprising that Israeli intelligence holds out little hope for a long-term cease-fire. General Aharon Ze'evi Farkash, the head of military intelligence, told the Cabinet that Arafat would stick to his dual use of terror and negotiations to achieve his political goal: a Palestinian state in all the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, control over the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) and implementation of the "right of return" for refugees. Intelligence officials predicted another year, at least, of armed conflict. Always the opponent of intelligence estimates, Peres argued that in a post-Sept. 11 world, Arafat would soon have to reject terrorism to survive politically, and Israel would have to forgo its occupation.

Time is a crucial factor in the Israeli internal debate. Peres told Sharon that their government has only seven or eight months of "quality political time" to reach a new deal with the Palestinians, before the country would be consumed by the next electoral campaign. The prime minister has yet to decide how to use that time. Should he go against his own history and ideology and try to cut a deal with Arafat? Or should he delay, meticulously negotiating each provision of the Mitchell plan and hoping for a relatively quiet period prior to elections? So far, Sharon has left both options open, but his political calendar is running out, as is his public approval rating.

American policy could prove decisive in influencing Sharon's decision-making process. And despite the general tendency of the Bush administration to be satisfied with a stable conflict that doesn't interfere with its Iraq preoccupation, there are some different voices. According to the classified diplomatic report, the State Department is arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian political process "should move very fast" as soon as a cease-fire is reached. State officials pin their hopes in the Saudi initiative, believing that its adoption at the Beirut summit next week would breathe new life into the peace process.

A more interesting clue, perhaps, came from the American ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer. Speaking last week at Tel Aviv University, Kurtzer, a veteran peacemaker, was asked about the Clinton plan of December 2000, which called for an Israeli withdrawal from virtually all the territories and the division of Jerusalem along ethnic lines. The former president took it off the table upon his departure from the White House and it is not an American policy, said the ambassador. But he added, "The Clinton ideas are worth studying, as they present a possible solution which both sides might achieve through negotiations." His listeners were left to wonder whether this was a private thought, or a hint from Washington.

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