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Friday, Jan 9, 2009
"Nobody believes that we'll return to Camp David," an Israeli diplomat told me, referring to the failed peace talks between Clinton, Arafat and Barak. "They seek a political process, but not necessarily a political solution."
Israelis see the Republicans as a bunch of coldhearted power players, lacking the idealistic peacemaking delusions of the Democrats. Hence their preference for "regional stability" over photo-ops, signing ceremonies and Nobel Prizes. The recent deeper American involvement notwithstanding, there are no signs of a profound change in the administration's priorities. All indications are that Bush is aiming at violence reduction and resumption of some political process between Israel and the Palestinians, but not much more. Of course, whether "regional stability" can be attained without a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians is an open question -- as is the possibility that such "stability" might be paid for by endless Israeli and Palestinian blood.
Cheney certainly offered no overarching vision for Mideast peace. He spoke in Jerusalem about a cease-fire and implementation of the two American plans for starting the peace process, the Tenet and Mitchell plans. The two plans offer a road map for ending the violence, restoring mutual confidence and returning to negotiations. The Tenet plan is a list of security demands on both sides, including a Palestinian dismantling of terror organizations and Israeli lifting of roadblocks and sanctions. The Mitchell plan calls for an Israeli settlement freeze, which poses a major challenge for Sharon, whose political base is right-wingers opposed to all territorial concessions. Nevertheless, both American plans lack an agenda for the eventual peace negotiations.
Bush has committed himself to the vision of a Palestinian state and an end to the Israeli occupation, and has embraced the Saudi formula of "full normalization for full withdrawal." But the current administration has never outlined the way to turn its vision into reality. It has refrained from giving any timetables and avoided discussing sensitive issues, such as the final borders of Palestine and Israel, the future of Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugee problem.
As for a possible U.S. attack on Iraq, most Israeli politicians and bureaucrats believe "Gulf War 2" is just a matter of time and logistic preparation. Echoing Washington's official line, Sharon says the U.S. told him it has not decided what to do about Iraq. But he -- and a few others, including Cabinet members Dan Meridor and Ephraim Sneh -- is in the minority. Leading figures from across the political spectrum are convinced an attack is coming. Former prime minister and aspiring right-wing candidate Binyamin Netanyahu, his Labor successor Ehud Barak, the leader of the left-wing "peace coalition" Yossi Beilin, defense minister Ben Eliezer and the outgoing ambassador to Washington David Ivry (who 21 years ago commanded the Israeli air force in its successful bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor Osiraq), all share this view. The military intelligence assessment, presented last Wednesday to the Israeli security Cabinet, concurred.
The message Bush sent to Sharon was clear. America is seeking to oust Saddam and change the regional power balance in America's and Israel's favor: Israel's role in the game is to behave itself and avoid being seen in Washington as a hurdle on the way to Baghdad. Sharon understood what was expected of him, but escalating terror attacks in late February and early March made him forget the lesson and overplay his military card.
According to a classified diplomatic report, the "breaking point" that caused American attitudes to change was Sharon's declaration on March 4 that the Palestinians should be "hit hard with many casualties" so they would beg for a cease-fire. The warning was followed with bloody "search and destroy" operations deep in the West Bank and Gaza that killed over 200 Palestinians. "Sharon's threats had a very negative effect in Washington," said the classified report, "and reinforced the perception that Sharon has no plan beside using force and more force. The refugee camp operations were seen as a military success, but as a total failure in every other aspect."
A senior Israeli diplomat in Washington cabled Jerusalem last week, criticizing his government's position. Analyzing the change in American stance toward Israel, he wrote, "The Bush administration seems to understand our constraints, and cannot understand why we cannot understand its constraints." The massive use of force was seen as folly even by those in the heart of Israel's security establishment. Avi Dichter, head of the Security Service (Shin Beth), told Wednesday's Cabinet meeting, "The aggressive military operations posed some threat to terrorists, but have also stimulated more terror attacks."
The late prime minister and military chief Yitzhak Rabin once explained that in a Middle East war, where decisive victories are seldom achieved, the first side to call for a cease-fire is the loser. Sharon was Rabin's longtime disciple and friend, but this time he failed the test and blinked first. Less than two weeks after boasting at the Knesset cafeteria that he was going to smash the Palestinians until they cried uncle, Sharon was the one asking for American help and saying that an immediate cease-fire was Israel's prime interest. The Palestinians felt they won the round -- that America, which had previously insisted that terrorist attacks were deal-breakers, had implicitly accepted their argument that attacks were inevitable until political progress was made. This was a bitter pill even for some dovish Israelis: Even Peres said that the Cheney meeting was "too much reward" for Arafat.
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