Thursday, Jul 24, 2008
Israeli politicians and analysts say that the U.S.'s sudden involvement is cosmetic and only designed to pave the way for an attack on Iraq.
Mar 22, 2002 | The Bush administration's decision to take a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict faces serious obstacles, both in the short and long term. In the short term, the latest Palestinian terror attacks have threatened U.S. envoy Anthony Zinni's efforts to prod the two sides toward a cease-fire. In the long term, the United States appears to have no vision of how to achieve Mideast peace, beyond vague promises of a Palestinian state and a firm commitment to Israel's security. Indeed, most observers here, Israelis and Palestinians alike, believe that Bush's sudden interest in the region has far more to do with preparing the way for an attack on Iraq than with any genuine attempt to resolve the deadly impasse.
Zinni's two earlier trips ended in failure, when upsurges in violence -- for which each side blamed the other -- wrecked negotiations. On Thursday, Zinni might have felt like he was caught in a time warp. The negotiations between the two sides were tough, with Israelis presenting a list of security demands while their rivals asked for a firm commitment on ending the occupation. But early Thursday, an Israeli security official said the two sides were close to an agreement on a cease-fire: "The only possible stumbling block might be another wave of suicide attacks." A few hours later, a suicide bomber blew himself up in central Jerusalem, at the same corner where many attacks had taken place before, killing two and wounding dozens of passersby. This happened about 32 hours after a bus bombing killed seven Israelis.
Few of those familiar with the grim logic that governs the protracted semi-war were surprised by the terror attacks. Militant Palestinians had made it clear that after Israel's massive military incursion into the refugee camps -- which drew a harsh rebuke from U.N. head Kofi Annan -- they would strike back. Arafat condemned the Jerusalem bombing. But Marwan Bargouti, the most prominent Fatah figure in the West Bank, blamed America's pro-Israel tilt, saying the attack was a response to Zinni's support for the Israeli line in the security talks.
The attacks have not derailed negotiations yet, but they led the United States to once again turn up the heat on Arafat. President Bush and Vice President Cheney, sitting side by side at the Oval Office, demanded that Arafat take concrete steps to stop terrorism, not merely promise to do so. Secretary of State Colin Powell called Arafat and told him he must act. Whether Israel and the U.S. would allow Arafat to travel to next week's Arab Summit in Beirut was thrown into question -- especially since the Al Aqsa faction of Fatah, Arafat's own organization, took responsibility for the Jerusalem attack (which led the State Department to include it on its list of terrorist organizations).
In response to the Jerusalem attack, Sharon suspended the cease-fire talks and convened his inner cabinet to discuss Israeli reaction, after having refrained from retaliation for the bus attack on Wednesday. The inner cabinet decided not to retaliate to the attacks, so as to give Zinni's mission a chance. Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer told Zinni that "the cease-fire could not be one-sided, and there are limits to our self-restraint." He also told Zinni of Bargouti's remarks. The American envoy said that he would continue with his mission for the time being, despite the setbacks.
American policy in the Middle East has taken a new direction in the past two weeks -- but how significant that change of course is remains to be seen. After more than a year of a hands-off, "let them bleed" approach towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Bush administration has stepped up its involvement, aiming to break the deadlock, halt the ever-growing body count, and achieve a viable cease-fire.
After months of managing the conflict from the safe distance of State Department briefings in Washington, American leaders and diplomats are now bordering on hyperactivity. Cheney toured the region and lent an attentive ear to the concerns of his Arab hosts, who told him that dealing with Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat is a far more urgent task than toppling Saddam Hussein. The United States sponsored U.N. Security Council Resolution 1397, embracing for the first time "a vision of two states, Israel and Palestine." And Bush dispatched Zinni back to the region with clear instructions and a stronger mandate to get both sides on the truce wagon.
Tactically, the White House ended months of visible tilt toward the Israeli side, taking a more balanced approach. Bush publicly criticized the Israeli military invasion of Palestinian towns and refugee camps. Cheney, who had excluded Arafat from his original itinerary -- infuriating the Palestinians -- ended up negotiating a complicated deal by which he would return to the region next week especially to meet Arafat, thus bailing him out of his virtual house arrest in the occupied territories and allowing him to attend the Arab summit in Beirut next Wednesday, where his participation is seen as crucial if the Saudi peace initiative is to move forward. The high-level meeting, the first of its kind during the Bush administration, is pending on Zinni's vouching for the Palestinian leader's good behavior.
Sensing the change in Washington, Sharon had waived some of his earlier demands, like the insistence on "seven quiet days" before any negotiations. Under more American pressure he withdrew the Israeli forces from Palestinian-controlled areas. These decisions caused an extreme right-wing party to bolt from his shaky coalition, making the Israeli prime minister even more dependent politically on his moderate partners from the Labor Party, foreign minister Shimon Peres and Ben-Eliezer.
Two questions arise out of the diplomatic flurry: What caused the shift in American policy, and where is Washington really heading? Has Bush decided to revive the stalled peace process and aim for "ending the conflict" like his failed predecessor Bill Clinton? Or is the administration simply trying to shore up America's alliances with its Arab friends, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which were strained in the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks, and prevent Arab rage over the Palestinian issue from destabilizing these strategically crucial regimes? The Saudis and Egyptians have for months been urgently asking Bush to intervene in the conflict and restrain Sharon.
The widespread view among Israeli officials and diplomats is that the new American involvement is cosmetic and should not be taken seriously. What the U.S. is really interested in, senior administration officials have confided to Israel, is a Saddam-removal operation, and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is only significant insofar as it affects that.
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