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Sunday, Nov 8, 2009
Finally, Bush's Middle East policies were heavily influenced by President Clinton's failure to achieve peace. The current intifada had already been raging for four months when Bush took office, with no end in sight. The lesson Bush took from this was to emphasize conflict management rather than conflict resolution. This approach fits the general tendency of the Bush administration to unilaterally promote American interests and not involve itself in other people's troubles. The theorist of the new line was Richard Haass, currently heading the policy planning staff at the State Department. Haass, a neoconservative, is known for his theory of "ripening" as the basis for peacemaking. In his book "Conflicts Unending," published over a decade ago, he argued that the United States should refrain from trying to resolve prolonged conflicts unless both sides -- whether because they are strong enough to compromise, or so weak they feel they have no choice -- are ready to do so. Only then is the conflict "ripe" for outside intervention. Indeed, untimely American intervention, in Haass' view, can make things worse. (The Bush administration's acceptance of this doctrine, and its bitter hostility to Clinton, were displayed last week when Bush's spokesman Ari Fleischer spoke out of turn and blamed Clinton for the deteriorating Mideast situation.) Visiting the region last month, Haass told his hosts in Israel that ways should be found to "reinvent" the peace process, with less ambitious goals than in the past.
Not surprisingly, considering his views and the failure of the Camp David talks, Bush also has a deep distrust of and antipathy toward Arafat. The Palestinian leader was a most welcomed guest in the previous White House; Bush decided to shut the door. He has refused to meet the Palestinian leader, while hosting Sharon four times in Washington in the course of one year.
This attitude has only been strengthened since Sept. 11, when Bush identified Arab terrorism as America's greatest threat. Some analysts both in Israel and the U.S. thought that the terror attacks might lead the U.S. to take a more aggressive role in the peace process in an attempt to address one of the root causes of Muslim rage. That has not happened: Instead, Bush has accepted Sharon's argument that harsh military responses to Palestinian suicide bombings in Israeli cities or in the occupied territories are as justified as America's military response to the Sept. 11 attacks. He has also accepted Sharon's view that Israel should not negotiate with the Palestinians before a cease-fire.
Bush continues to support the Mitchell Commission report and its security preamble, the Tenet plan, as a blueprint for getting out of the mess. Both plans maintain that truce comes before diplomacy, although they also call for Israel to stop building settlements in the occupied territories. He has also pledged to veto any U.N. resolution aimed at sending international peacekeepers to the occupied territories, an idea firmly opposed by Israel, which fears that an international body would be biased against it.
Strategically, Bush cares about one thing only, "regional stability" -- i.e. a continuation of the status quo, with no wars that would impede the flow of oil or otherwise threaten American interests. He regards Israeli-Palestinian violence as a mere nuisance that needs to be held in check, but no more, and doesn't see it as potentially destabilizing or as having acute negative strategic consequences. Tired of playing the referee, Washington is satisfied now with setting the rules of the game, leaving the contenders to bloody each other.
Still, Bush, urged on by the Saudis, has made some gestures toward the Arab side in the conflict. He declared that a Palestinian state was official American policy. Secretary Powell laid out the administration's road map for peace in a November speech. Anthony Zinni was appointed as the administration's special envoy, sent to mediate the cease-fire. But Zinni's visit coincided with a burst of Palestinian suicide attacks, and he withdrew, blaming Arafat. Then came the Karine A affair, in early January, when the Israelis intercepted an arms-laden ship en route from Iran to Arafat's Palestinian Authority. The president felt deceived, and while the United Stated vowed to keep Arafat in power, the Palestinian leader's credibility sank. All these attempts have failed to achieve even 48 hours of cease-fire.
The State Department, traditionally more concerned with America's relations with its Arab allies, has tried to promote a more activist approach. At one point it proposed sending American monitors to the field. Israeli officials regard Aaron Miller, a veteran diplomat and the last holdover from the Clinton-era "peace team," as the source of diplomatic creativity in Washington. The Sharon circle sees Miller as an old-time "Peace Now" softie, who has not adapted yet to Washington and Jerusalem's new hard-line mentality. Daniel Kurtzer, the American ambassador in Tel Aviv, has the same image, and enjoys limited access to the prime minister. Sharon's main contacts with Washington are made through his own phone conversations with Powell, or via Sharon's personal friend, New York businessman Arie Genger, who acts as the go-between, bypassing formal diplomatic channels.
The internal power game in Washington has played into Sharon's hands. The hawks, whose stronghold is the Pentagon, hold a black-and-white view of the world: They see Israel in the right and Arafat in the wrong. Their ascendancy is reflected in Bush's axis-of-evil rhetoric. The top echelons of the Defense Department include some ardent supporters of Israel, like Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Undersecretary for Policy Doug Feith, formerly a right-wing pro-Israel activist in Washington. In January, following the Karine A incident, they tried unsuccessfully to persuade Bush to cut ties with Arafat. In the White House, there is currently no strong voice opposing the Defense hawks. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice echoes the hawk line: She opposes deeper American intervention in the conflict and has no trust in Arafat.
