Sunday, Sep 7, 2008
Robert Hathaway is director of the Asia program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
The real triggering event was Sharif's decision in July to withdraw the Pakistani troops who had infiltrated Indian territory in Kashmir. What happened was Sharif saw Pakistan was taking a military beating in Kashmir, and an economic beating at home and in the international community. But the roots of the problem go back further than this summer.
The last military dictator of Pakistan was killed in 1988 in an as-
The Pakistani military had become increasingly disillusioned ... By any measure, the economy is going down the tubes. The social indicators are terrible. Whether you talk about literacy, infant mortality, people who live without electricity or health care, it's staggering.
What Pakistan has had since 1988 is poor leaders. Sharif was prime minister twice, [Benazir] Bhutto twice. But neither demonstrated any real ability to govern or meet the needs of the people. Both surrounded themselves with corrupt officials.
I don't want to overemphasis it, but another factor is the role that Islamic radicals have played or might play in the takeover. To many Islamic radicals, Kashmir was a holy war, and the pullout by Sharif was not only a betrayal of the nation, but a betrayal of a solemn religious obligation to help their Muslim brothers.
There are things the U.S. can do, has already done, and should do in the future. First, we need to recognize that our influence is limited ... We should send a message that we have no intention of conducting business as usual with Pakistan. This means that we will vote in the World Bank against loans to Pakistan. It means we will use the United Nations and other international forums to highlight what has transpired. It means that we will not give them diplomatic support in the disputes with India or other countries. Not so long as the military is in power.
Marshall Bouton is executive vice president of the Asia Society.
A lot of attention has been paid to differences that emerged between the military and Sharif. There was growing tension between the military and the prime minister. The prime minister was looking to contain the influence of the military. He dismissed the previous military authority for remarks that were taken as a suggestion that the military should have more power. There was growing concern among the military about the stability of the government and economy in the country. Ultimately the army considers itself the guardian of the country's stability and integrity.
The political institutions in Pakistan did not acquire the roots in the national body politic that would help them over time. There was always this tension and between the government and the military. You had a relationship of distrust that in turn undermined the development of a political elite.
Success of military coups in the history of Pakistan varies widely. There is a widespread expectation that this new regime will lay out some kind of phased plan that will go from something short of martial law to technocratic, non-elected civilian government to full democratic control.
It will be difficult because the political institutions and the elite are not strong enough to sustain such a plan, so there's no one whom the military can look to, to carry out this plan.
The United States has to send a three-layered message to the new military leaders:
1. We don't approve of extra-constitutional changes of government, period.
2. We expect them to lay out a plan for return to civilian authority and eventually some legitimate democratic process.
3. This is a message best sent privately: We would be strongly opposed to any steps that would raise tensions with India. We expect the new government to not do anything to raise tensions and actually to find a way to reduce them.
They must recognize -- if their purpose is to safeguard the integrity of Pakistan -- that the path to that does not run through conflict with India.
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