A matter of survival

Just to be clear -- are you advocating that we use military power?

I certainly think the application of military power to date has been dainty. Had we used our own people and our military power, we probably would have gotten bin Laden at Tora Bora [in Afghanistan] in the winter of 2001. But we didn't. We counted on surrogates. I think that's a prime example. We attacked Afghanistan, and the estimate was there were 50,000 Taliban guys with guns. We let probably 40,000 go home. In Iraq we let 400 out of 500,000 go home. It just seems to me that we've got to come to grips with the idea that if we're going to survive, and we're not going to change policies, then the only option for defending America is the military option.

You paint this as a matter of survival.

Yes, very much so.

You think if we don't respond correctly our entire way of life will be threatened? Does "a matter of survival" mean there is the possibility that a nuclear weapon will be used?

Well, no, not to that extent. But certainly if they have a weapon of mass destruction, they'll use it. They don't want to fight this war forever. They're looking to win, and winning to them simply means getting us out of the region.

That brings up the issue of what the "enemy" is. You say that al-Qaida is different from the wider Islamist movement. Not everyone is a member of al-Qaida; not everyone is a Wahhabi. But there is this political Islamic movement, and many of its members do believe that an Islamic nation will be established, what they call the caliphate. I have talked to some who believe that even the United States can eventually become an Islamic nation. But that's not really al-Qaida's goal, you argue. So what are we talking about exactly? What is the enemy? Is it just al-Qaida?

No, it is certainly not just al-Qaida anymore. It is various and sundry groups that are associated with it. And unfortunately [the movement] is increasingly becoming one of attacks on Americans by people who have no connection to al-Qaida but agree with its goals and its criticism of our policy. Bin Laden's goal has been very clear from the start. He believes that eventually Islam will reestablish a caliphate, but that's not his goal. I don't think he believes anyone is going to die for that kind of amorphous dream.

His goal is to focus first on the United States, because he sees that governments in the Middle East that he opposes and thinks are apostate -- and Israel -- exist because we protect them militarily and give [billions of dollars] worth of aid to Israel and to the Turks and the Egyptians.

Let's talk a little bit about your experiences in seeing this information filter up, or not, to policymakers. You praise former CIA director George Tenet, and I'm interested in your opinion of him. But you also say we need to get rid of these craven bureaucrats who are not presenting the unvarnished truth. Is that possible?

If it's not, we're in serious trouble. Because as long as Mr. Clinton and Mr. Bush are saying that religion has nothing to do with this -- that the movement bin Laden personifies is what Tenet called the "lunatic fringe of the lunatic fringe" of the Muslim world -- as long as our leaders are saying those things, it's clear to me that the message from the people who work the issue is not getting up the chain of command.

But have you considered that it is too politically explosive for them to say otherwise?

Absolutely. But it's so politically incorrect to say it that I don't believe there are any senior bureaucrats who are going to carry [such a message] to the president: "If you go into Iraq, you'll be occupying two of the holiest places in Islam, and the Israelis will have the third [Jerusalem]. And therefore you will anger 1.3 billion Muslims." I doubt that message was delivered.

So whose fault is this?

I think there's a certain moral cowardice in the senior levels of the bureaucracy in the intelligence community. Certainly in the past 12 years the intelligence community has become an experimental lab, if you will, for multiculturalism, diversity, just general political correctness. I don't think there's anyone who approves of harassment in the workplace or discrimination because you're a woman or a minority. But the truth of the matter is, when you're talking about interactions between societies and people, you must talk about cultural attributes, the power of religion, the effect of tribalism, animosities driven by ethnic differences. And until you do that, you haven't done your job.

The atmosphere within the intelligence community is not one that promotes a freewheeling debate. One of the best short examples of that is from a brilliant woman named Ellen Laipson [a Clinton-era National Security Council staffer]. She wrote in Foreign Affairs a review of Dan Benjamin and Steve Simon's book ["The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam's War Against America"] and of how, in her experience, many analysts who were bright and recognized the problem were afraid to voice their views because they were afraid they'd be identified as not part of the team.

Is this why you wrote the book?

It's one of the reasons I wrote the book, absolutely. I frankly think that nothing in my book will not be recognized by people who work the issue on a day-to-day basis. When I talk to an interviewer, and I listen to what I'm saying, I sometimes think they're going to get up and walk out, because it's boilerplate. But the people I talk to sometimes look at me like I have three purple heads. "It's about religion? It's about policies? Well, that's kind of racist, isn't it?" And I say, "No, it's just reality."

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