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Wednesday, Nov 25, 2009
More Guard members are fighting and dying in Iraq than in any war since Korea. But Rumsfeld's plan to keep the Guard out of combat is drawing fire.
Aug 19, 2003 | Two weeks ago 600 mourners, including Gov. George Pataki, filled the pews at St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church in Canandaigua, a small town in upstate New York, to honor Sgt. Heath McMillin, 29. The father of three was killed in Iraq when his unit came under attack while maintaining night patrol in a small village south of Baghdad. A rocket-propelled grenade struck the military vehicle McMillin was riding in.
He was among the more than 60 American soldiers who have been killed in action by guerrilla attacks in Iraq since President Bush announced on May 1 that major military action had ended there. The death toll is still small enough so that each one resonates within the armed services. But McMillin's death was a particularly painful blow for the National Guard, because he was not a full-time soldier. He worked for a masonry supply company and, hoping for a career as a state trooper, signed up to serve as an M.P. in Buffalo's 105th Military Police Company. McMillin became the first New York Army National Guard soldier in half a century to be killed in action.
That unwanted distinction has been handed out in several states, as National Guardsmen, more accustomed to pitching in locally during flood and hurricane season, find themselves serving extended tours on the front lines of the chaotic and deadly reconstruction in Iraq, filling widening personnel gaps in the downsized military, and stationed away from their families for seasons at a time. Nearly 30 percent of the forces in Iraq today are made up of National Guard units, busy policing streets, escorting convoys, manning checkpoints, and building soccer fields.
"They're good guys in the Guard," says Ralph Peters, a retired Army intelligence officer. "But this is not what they signed up for."
To date, the Guard has suffered 11 casualties in Iraq. Nine of those occurred in the month of July alone, according to the National Guard Bureau, an office of the Defense Department.
The tally may seem slight, but for the Guard, which hasn't sustained combat casualties since the Korean War and depends on an air of stability to attract recruits, the deaths represent the latest in what has been a wave of watershed moments for the venerable institution.
"We've seen an extraordinary redefining of the Guard's traditional mission," says Jerry Cooper, the author of "The Rise of the National Guard." "And whether it's acceptable to people who joined, or they'll say to hell with it and not reenlist, I don't know."
The fear is that the steady diet of headlines about guerrilla attacks and hellish, 120-degree conditions in Iraq, combined with the possibility of putting in nine-month tours overseas, may drain the Guard's ranks in coming years. That, at a time when it's playing an increasingly complex role in the U.S. military, which finds itself overextended around the globe. As the Stars & Stripes newspaper warned last week, "The strain on forces is broader and deeper than at any time since an all-volunteer force began 30 years ago."
"I think, if history is any indication, there will be a short-term detrimental effect on recruiting and retention," says Michael Doubler, the author of "Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000." He says if the Guard's latest recruiting numbers, due Sept. 30, are off by as little as 2 or 3 percent, "that will be deep cause for concern."
Today, nearly 100,000 Guard troops are deployed, with another 26,000 placed on alert for early next year. By comparison, 75,000 Guard troops were deployed during the first Gulf War. Virtually all of them returned home within six months. And the Guard's mission in Iraq will continue to expand in the coming months: It is preparing to send two entire combat brigades to Iraq, totaling 10,000 citizen-soldiers, early next year. They will relieve active duty soldiers, the ones who helped topple Saddam Hussein's regime, and will likely serve for a year themselves.
"Sending entire National Guard brigades overseas for as much as one year? You have to go back to Korean War or the World Wars to find examples of that," says Doubler, who asks, "At what point do we reach the tipping point where the Guard's contribution hurts the ability of the organization to sustain itself and attract volunteers?"
The heavy lifting on the part of the Guard is causing concern, but today's central role for the citizen-soldiers is precisely what military leaders envisioned when, after the quagmire of the Vietnam War, they instituted a new strategy known as the Total Force Policy.
By intermingling critical duties between those on active duty and the Guard, the Total Force Policy requires presidents who want to fight a major war to call up tens of thousands of Guard troops, forcing administrations to deal with the important political, economic and social ramifications of sending off to war part-time soldiers, many in their 30s with families and careers.
In a sense, the choreographed call-ups test the will of the country by disrupting communities, small businesses, and even local police departments, some of which lose 20 percent of their manpower when local Guard units are activated.
The policy change came in response to President Johnson's refusal to call up the Guard to fight in Vietnam, which is part of why it became a safe haven of sorts for draft-age men of that area, including George W. Bush, who joined the Texas Air National Guard. Many historians believe Johnson ignored his generals' request for political reasons, fearing Guard mobilization would have sparked even wider opposition to the war.
"Johnson wanted to pretend there was no war, and to mobilize the Guard would be to admit this was a genuine war," says Cooper. "In '65 and '66 he was afraid if you call up the Guard and take 700 to 800 grown men out of a community -- as opposed to drafting 18-year-olds at random and who might leave the region anyway -- that would create vocal opposition to the war."
Today's current policy "serves the country well because it means politicians have to make choices -- whether to disrupt local communities in order to engage in major military operations overseas," says Peters, the author of "Beyond Terror: Strategy in a Changing World." "It's one more test. If a military operation is not worth mobilizing the Guard, then is it worth doing?"
The Guard, and particular its full-time officer leadership eager to prove the department's worth, welcomed the central role that Total Force Policy placed on its corps of part-time soldiers. And Total Force Policy was put to the test, successfully, during the first Gulf War. The difference today is that Guard troops in Iraq and the Persian Gulf region face far deadlier conditions and much longer deployments.
So the question has become, does the Total Force Policy work, or is it putting too much weight on the Guard's part-time force, and will that in the end turn off recruits and deplete the ranks? And if some inside the Guard family -- including troops, along with their nervous husbands and wives -- are uncomfortable with its relatively new high-profile, high-danger role in Iraq, shouldn't the Guard itself consider giving back some of its toughest responsibilities?
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld is also concerned about the constant Guard deployments, as well as the need to fight terrorism more rapidly. He wants to retool the Total Force Policy, making it easier for the United States to wage a major war without mobilizing the Guard.
In a memorandum dated July 9 and addressed to the secretaries of the military departments, Rumsfeld stated he wanted to "structure active and reserve forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve" and to eliminate that need "during the first 15 days of a rapid response operation."
The secretaries have until the end of August to respond with their assessment and plan of implementation.
"It's a moment of truth for the Guard," says Peters, who notes the paradox at play. "The Guard wants to have the capability, but it doesn't always want to deploy it."
