And escalating American-Iranian hostility by a unilateral military reprisal against Iran, as Bush's saber-rattling speech hints we might do, would be catastrophic for positive change in Iran -- not to mention its devastating effects on America's standing in the entire region. Already our European allies have distanced themselves from President Bush's tough talk, correctly suspecting that he is using the terror war to advance unrelated foreign policy goals against old American foes. Moreover, military action against Iran wouldn't work. An attack on Iran will only cause its people to close ranks around the conservative mullahs, refocusing their energy outwards towards a foreign foe instead of inwards at a restrictive regime. Iran's new generation has little reason to hate America. It would be imprudent to give them one.
We have a precedent for this exact scenario in the not too distant past. In 1986 the Reagan administration bombed Libya, claiming that it had unequivocally silenced one of the demons of global state-sponsored terrorism, Colonel Moammar Gadhafi. We know now that American aggression only rallied the country to Gadhafi's side, allowing him to crack down on the Libyan resistance movement, which had been growing in strength. Moreover, the Reagan bombing didn't prevent Libyan agents from downing Pan Am Flight 103 two years later. After Sept. 11, Americans know firsthand what effect a foreign attack on a country's soil can have on patriotic feeling among its citizens and the approval rating of leaders (including those whose legitimacy had been called into question). Iran's mullahs have become increasingly unpopular. Let's not reverse this trend.
The weapon America has that the ruling mullahs of Iran fear most is one we have not used yet. It is not a bomb or a missile. It is the unmatched power of cultural and economic exchange that has made and remade societies for millennia. Greater contact with the outside world will obliterate the climate of paranoia and fear in Iran and empower its people, especially its bold young people, to challenge the ruling classes in even more provocative ways.
An Iran that is more integrated with the world community of nations would also be a more law-abiding, moderate country. The business of terrorism and nuclear proliferation becomes more costly for a government when it stands to lose substantial trade and investment by maintaining these policies. Hundreds of thousands of new jobs need to be created each year in Iran. By providing some of those jobs through increased economic ties, we create a constituency within Iran for moderation and lawful behavior. By continuing to blockade Iran, we deprive ourselves of this crucial leverage over Iran's actions.
But what about Iran's support for anti-Israel terrorist groups -- the single issue most decisive in leading the Bush administration, which was lobbied hard by Israel, to place Iran in the "axis of evil" column? Iran has a hard-line anti-Israel stance and supports Hezbollah, the militant Lebanese-based Shi'ite group. To a lesser extent, it provides support to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and, to a much lesser extent, Hamas. The latter two groups have staged numerous terrorist attacks against Israel. As a result, the U.S. State Department lists Iran as "the most active state sponsor of terrorism."
Ending Iran's support for these groups in the endless semi-war between Israel and the Palestinians is a key goal of America's Iran policy. But allowing that entire policy to be determined by that is unwise, as numerous analysts have pointed out.
In any case, befriending the Iranian regime, not justifying Iran's support for terrorism by remaining hostile, is a more effective strategy. (Even the head of Israel's intelligence service, Mossad, believes that pursuing better relations with Iran will ensure Israel's security better than confrontation.) When terrorism as a goal truly becomes too costly for the Iranian regime, jeopardizing lucrative relations with Western partners, the Iranian government itself will begin to crack down on those supporting terrorism. There is precedent for this exact scenario in President Musharraf's Pakistan. Tied to the West by lucrative IMF loans and trade relations, Pakistan's regime was quick to side with America against its former Taliban and al-Qaida clients. Under American pressure, President Musharraf has even cracked down on the Pakistani resistance groups that have waged terrorist attacks in the disputed Kashmir region.
If Iran was really preparing to rain nuclear missiles down on Tel Aviv, as Safire warned, of course there would be no question of detente. But Safire confuses rhetoric with reality. Iran does indeed want nuclear weapons, not as an offensive arsenal but as a defensive deterrent to foreign aggression. There is ample historical reason for this: During the eight-year war with Iraq, Iraqi bombs and missiles, supplied by America and other Western nations, mercilessly fell on Iranian cities, killing thousands of people. In the current environment of growing opposition at home and accelerated encirclement abroad, the mullahs of Iran are concerned more with self-preservation than exporting revolution. Launching nuclear attacks on Israel would be an act of suicide, resulting in the immediate annihilation of the Iranian regime at the hands of Israel and the U.S.
Moreover, the elected government of Mohammad Khatami and his foreign minister Kamal Kharazi have considerably softened on the issue of Israel and the peace process. President Khatami himself publicly hinted recently that if the Palestinian people choose to recognize Israel and reach a settlement, then Iran must accept this.
Inflammatory sermons by hard-line mullahs aside, a strong streak of pragmatism is discernible in Iran's behavior. This is an important clue to the potential within the Iranian regime for constructive dialogue. Look at Iran's actions on the ground over the last decade. During the Gulf War, when the region was aflame with anti-American sentiment, Iran stayed prudently on the sidelines. Iranian officials have brokered deals to help American hostages gain freedom in Lebanon. They have publicly distanced themselves from Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 death sentence against British writer Salman Rushdie. Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has agreed to constant monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, something other American allies such as Israel and Pakistan have refused to allow. Although it did not join the military effort against the Taliban, Iran did agree to cooperate with the United States on search and rescue efforts if American planes were shot down over Iran and opened a port to ship American wheat to the Afghan people. "By and large, the Iranian role diplomatically has been quite constructive," according to the State Department's director of policy planning, Richard N. Haass.
In short, Iran has some history as a peaceable member of the international community, although this behavior has not grabbed headlines like more extremist deeds and language. Moderate ayatollahs who resist extremism in Iran are not a myth, as the Bush administration would like us to believe in order to justify its hostile agenda.
Finally, there are powerful strategic and security concerns that argue for better relations with Iran. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, it has become clear that long-term peace and stability in the Middle East is not just a vague foreign policy objective but critical to our security as a nation. We have proven we are good at waging war. But as the Gulf War showed, sustaining a long-term, prosperous peace after victory is often more elusive. Saddam Hussein is still a threat over 10 years later. Forging appropriate friendships in the region will be as important as destroying adversaries. And by virtue of its geography, culture, and resources, Iran can exercise a singular influence over the region and help ensure our interests.