Beyond tribalism

Controversial Israeli historian Tom Segev says a new generation of Israelis is moving beyond Zionism -- but there will be no peace until old warriors Sharon and Arafat are gone.

By Suzy Hansen

Dec 8, 2001 | Israeli historian and journalist Tom Segev is accustomed to controversy. Segev's books, which include "1949: The First Israelis," "The Seven Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust" and his latest, "One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate," have been bitterly attacked, both in Israel and abroad, and just as vehemently defended. With his fellow "new historians," who include Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Simha Flapan, and Ilan Pappé, Segev has challenged the most cherished assertions about the founding of the state of Israel, claiming that the Jewish state bears a far greater share of responsibility for the Palestinian tragedy than traditional Israeli historians were willing to accept.

In his new book, Segev turns to the British Mandate -- that momentous 30-year interval between the end of World War I and the creation of the state of Israel in 1947 when Britain ruled post-Ottoman Palestine and tried, with increasing desperation, to prevent two budding nationalist movements from turning on each other and their British masters. A journalist (he writes a column for the major Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz) as well as a historian, Segev is a master storyteller, adept at mining historical archives for dramatic stories, mingling remarkable personal tales with the larger movement of history. The conclusion to his gripping story is pessimistic: He believes that the Zionist project and the Arab national movement in Palestine could not coexist, and that violent conflict was therefore inevitable.

An especially controversial aspect of Segev's book is its assertion that the British were more pro-Zionist than many Israelis have traditionally believed -- and that Israel therefore owes its existence, in large part, to the British. Segev claims that a major reason for British support for the Zionist cause was a quasi-mystical belief held by many senior British officials that the Jews had extraordinary power in world affairs -- a belief made up of equal parts Christian philo-Judaism and anti-Semitism. Segev's thesis that the British tilted toward the Jews -- and in a larger sense, his objectivity -- was attacked by Tel Aviv University professor Anita Shapira, who argues in a long New Republic review that Segev makes selective use of sources and twists the evidence against the Jews and towards the Arabs. But other reviewers have lavished praise on "One Palestine," citing its fairness, its rich panoply of characters and its historical sweep.

Segev spoke with Salon by phone from his office at Rutgers University, where he is a visiting professor this year.

You're considered one of Israel's "new historians," a movement that has been very controversial within Israel. What was the Israeli reaction to "One Palestine, Complete"?

There was a tremendous reaction. It immediately became a bestseller. Everybody talked about it. For a while, it seemed as if a wave of nostalgia was sweeping the country, as if people wanted to go back to the British Mandate. Obviously, some people said that I'm wrong. Some Israelis and some Palestinians had all kinds of criticisms about the book which, of course, is OK and which, of course, I don't agree with. It caused a very lively discussion.

The critics were mostly from the right?

Yes. They felt that the book was too pro-Palestinian, which is why I was somewhat surprised and amused to read the very critical review of the book in the Journal of Palestinian Studies. They really presented it as being too pro-Zionist.

What were their criticisms?

They claimed that it doesn't tell you enough about the sufferings of the Palestinians and doesn't take into account many Arab sources, which it really does. Basically, it was a political criticism, just as people in Israel had political or ideological remarks to make about the book -- those coming from the right, as you said. The idea that Israel really owes its existence to the British Empire is something that annoys many Israelis.

Why do you think it does?

Because we all grew up to believe that Israel was born out of a heroic struggle against the British oppressors, which was true for a very short period of time at the very end [of the British Mandate.] That is the collective memory and that is also what we learn in school. We don't really learn how supportive the British were of the Zionist movement from the very beginning. We also don't realize that the Zionist movement and Israel owe so much to British support. That comes as an unpleasant surprise to those people who were taught to study and remember our heroic struggle.

Has that been changed in Israeli schools?

Yes, many things have changed. You mentioned the new historians -- they are 15 years old by now. Things have filtered down into Israeli textbooks and through the media, books, newspaper articles and television. Textbooks today are much less mythological and ideological than they used to be.

Has that had a noticeable effect on the younger Israeli generations?

It is part of an overall process that is going on in Israel. That is the subject of another book which I published after "One Palestine, Complete": "The New Zionists." It describes recent developments in Israel, all of which seem to be leading us to something people call a "post-Zionist" situation. The new Zionists are part of that process. They are not the ones who instigate the changes; they are part of the changes.

We have a generation of Israelis today, especially people living in Tel Aviv and in places that look up to Tel Aviv, where people don't live for any ideology anymore. They don't live for the past or the future. They live for life itself and they live very much in the spirit of the American culture. They are much more open to realize, for example, that we share at least part of the responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee situation and for the tragedy of 1948 [when 750,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled during Israel's war for independence.] They are much more open to hearing that because the whole country is more open and pluralistic and less ideological. This is something that has happened particularly since Oslo [the 1993 peace accords between Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which gave rise to great hope that peace might finally be at hand].

But since the present intifada began 14 months ago, we are being pushed back in time to tribal togetherness and closeness, which is really the major damage that we suffer as a result of terrorism. Of course, [we suffer] lost lives and tragedies. But in addition to that, what terrorism does to the fabric of the society, to the mentality and to the collective mood is perhaps even more damaging because it really stops that process [of becoming more open and pluralistic].

How much do you think the last 14 months will set Israel back in this way?

I'm not sure that I can answer that because I don't really know what the long-term effects of this intifada will be. The effect of the previous intifada [which started in late 1987 and waned in late 1991] was quite surprising. Israelis found a greater willingness to get rid of the war and the tension. The Palestinians learned from our willingness to enter into the Oslo Accords that Israelis only understand the language of force, something we only say about the Arabs. But there's no question that the first intifada is part of what led the Israelis to realize that it's not worth it.

In that sense we are very similar to the British. The British realized as early as 1939 that their role in Palestine was over.

Was that because of the Arab rebellion in 1936? (The Arab rebellion was a failed uprising against the British authorities and the Jews.)

Yes, three years of Arab terrorism. Not that the British weren't strong enough to put it down, to crush it. Eventually they did. But they asked themselves, "Is it worth it?" And, of course, Israelis could defeat the intifada of the 1980s -- we call it the "first" intifada when in reality the first intifada is the one of the 1930s -- but most Israelis thought that it wasn't worth it. Most Israelis said, "Why are we in Gaza? Let's get out of Gaza. Why are we in Jenin? Why are we in Hebron? Why are we in Jericho?" This is how Oslo was born.

I asked myself: How is it possible that all of a sudden so many Israelis realize that other things may be more worthwhile than chasing Palestinian kids in Gaza? This is when I realized that it's all part of the process of becoming less ideological, less nationalistic, more open, more pluralistic, more Americanized -- and more Jewish, in the sense of pluralism and openness to alternatives.

And now?

Now, we are all disillusioned and confused and very angry. So it's too early to say what the long-term effect will be.

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